On Apr 25, 7:11*pm, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 4/25/2012 5:30 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> > On Apr 24, 7:52 am, George > *wrote:
> >> On 7/30/2007 7:07 AM, pearl wrote:
>
> >>> ANIMAL RIGHTS BILL 1 - Tom Regan speaks.
> >>> Video (8.38 minutes)
> >>>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ADhNch30Img
>
> >> Regan says, *"They [animals] are not only in the world, they are aware
> >> of it, and also what happens to them." *Bullshit. *Animals are *not*
> >> aware that they are in the world, they don't even know there's a world,
> >> and they have no concept whatever of any "fate" in store for them.
>
> > The claim is that animals are aware of the world. To quote Ludwig
> > Wittgenstein, "The world is everything that is the case."
>
> Sophistry.
>

What, what Ludwig Wittgenstein said? How would you define the world,
thenm?

> > Animals are
> > aware of some aspects of reality. They are not aware of the existence
> > of the planet earth or the universe, and they are not able to think at
> > a sufficient level of abstraction to be able to think to themselves
> > "The world is everything that is the case", but they are aware of some
> > aspects of reality, and that is enough for the claim to be true.
>
> Animals are not aware that they exist *in* reality. *No animal
> contemplates in any way the relationship between itself and the rest of
> reality.
>

The claim was that they are aware of the world. All that it takes for
this claim to be true is for them to be aware of some aspects of
reality.

> >> Regan: *"And what happens to them matters to them." *Wrong.
>
> > Actually, it is very obviously true.
>
> No, it is very obviously false. **Nothing* matters to them.

These claims are quite absurd.

>*"Matters to
> them" is completely alien to animal mentation.
>
>
>
> >> "Like us, they bring a unified psychological presence to the world."
> >> Bullshit - pure mealymouthed psychobabble.
>
> > It's not bullshit.
>
> It's unadulterated bullshit.

On 4/25/2012 1:19 PM, Rupert wrote:
> On Apr 25, 7:11 pm, George > wrote:
>> On 4/25/2012 5:30 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>> On Apr 24, 7:52 am, George > wrote:
>>>> On 7/30/2007 7:07 AM, pearl wrote:
>>
>>>>> ANIMAL RIGHTS BILL 1 - Tom Regan speaks.
>>>>> Video (8.38 minutes)
>>>>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ADhNch30Img
>>
>>>> Regan says, "They [animals] are not only in the world, they are aware
>>>> of it, and also what happens to them." Bullshit. Animals are *not*
>>>> aware that they are in the world, they don't even know there's a world,
>>>> and they have no concept whatever of any "fate" in store for them.
>>
>>> The claim is that animals are aware of the world. To quote Ludwig
>>> Wittgenstein, "The world is everything that is the case."
>>
>> Sophistry.
>>
>
> What, what Ludwig Wittgenstein said? How would you define the world,
> thenm?
>
>>> Animals are
>>> aware of some aspects of reality. They are not aware of the existence
>>> of the planet earth or the universe, and they are not able to think at
>>> a sufficient level of abstraction to be able to think to themselves
>>> "The world is everything that is the case", but they are aware of some
>>> aspects of reality, and that is enough for the claim to be true.
>>
>> Animals are not aware that they exist *in* reality. No animal
>> contemplates in any way the relationship between itself and the rest of
>> reality.
>>
>
> The claim was that they are aware of the world. All that it takes for
> this claim to be true is for them to be aware of some aspects of
> reality.

No, that's wrong. Aspects of reality are not reality itself. The tale
of the six blind men and the elephant ought to tell you that.


>>>> Regan: "And what happens to them matters to them." Wrong.
>>
>>> Actually, it is very obviously true.
>>
>> No, it is very obviously false. *Nothing* matters to them.
>
> These claims are quite absurd.

They're not. They're correct. Because:


>
>> "Matters to them" is completely alien to animal mentation.

Because of that.


>>
>>>> "Like us, they bring a unified psychological presence to the world."
>>>> Bullshit - pure mealymouthed psychobabble.
>>
>>> It's not bullshit.
>>
>> It's unadulterated bullshit.
>

On 7/26/2007 5:02 AM, Rupert wrote:
> On Jul 26, 6:06 pm, > wrote:
>> Rupert wrote:
>>> On Jul 6, 5:41 pm, > wrote:
>>>>> That's not the meaning of "discrimination" we're talking about here.
>>>>> We're saying that, if you make different moral judgements about two
>>>>> different cases, you're under an obligation to specify a morally
>>>>> relevant difference between them.
>>>> How many times do I have to repeat this? The chief morally relevant
>>>> differences between humans and non-humans, in fact among all organisms, are
>>>> intelligence and sentience.
>>
>>> But this doesn't distinguish *all* humans from *all* nonhumans. How
>>> many times do I have to repeat *that*?
>>
>> You never even have to think it again, it has been dispelled by an
>> alternative way of approaching the whole subject of moral beings.
>> "THE MORAL STATUS OF BEINGS WHO ARE NOT PERSONS;
>> A CASUISTIC ARGUMENT "
>>
>
> Yes, I know you're impressed by that essay. I'm not impressed by that
> part of it, as it stands. I don't find the explanation of the crucial
> notion of "capacity" to be anything approaching adequate.

Why not? Just because it doesn't fit with what you want to believe?

You /could/ learn what it is, but you're too lazy and self-absorbed for
it. Here's a start:

"Thus, asked whether she can multiply two digit numbers, a child
who at present can only multiply one-digit numbers may say that
she cannot do so at present (ability), but that she is sure she
could learn to do so if properly instructed (capability)."


>> The class of beings called "moral persons" satisfies this objection. No
>> non-human possesses the inherent capacity to be a moral agent or to
>> display the other markers for advanced intelligence and sentience. You
>> have tried to hang your hat on a supposed lack of clarity of the word
>> "capacity",
>
> Pretty much no attempt has been made to explain this crucial concept.

Bullshit. You're just too ****ing lazy to go find it. I found it, and
I don't pretend to be a specialist.


> He's saying there's some property that all humans have and no
> nonhumans have.

No, he isn't. He isn't saying what all humans have at all.


> Fine, then it's his burden to state what it is.

Except that he's not saying it.


> He hasn't even begun to embark on this task.

Nor will he - he doesn't need to do so.


>
>> but that objection is weak and has not been put forth. In
>> fact capacity is a transparent concept, an acorn possesses the capacity
>> to become an oak tree, a fertile egg possesses the capacity to be a
>> chicken, a baby human and a person in a coma possess the capacity to
>> become a moral agent.
>>
>
> That sounds like by "capacity" you mean "potential ability", which he
> explicitly disavows.

No, he doesn't. Stop lying about what he wrote.


> And "potential ability" won't cover the cases
> where the human is permanently impaired.

He addresses that separately.

On Apr 26, 5:59*am, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 7/26/2007 5:02 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Jul 26, 6:06 pm, > *wrote:
> >> Rupert wrote:
> >>> On Jul 6, 5:41 pm, > *wrote:
> >>>>> That's not the meaning of "discrimination" we're talking about here..
> >>>>> We're saying that, if you make different moral judgements about two
> >>>>> different cases, you're under an obligation to specify a morally
> >>>>> relevant difference between them.
> >>>> How many times do I have to repeat this? The chief morally relevant
> >>>> differences between humans and non-humans, in fact among all organisms, are
> >>>> intelligence and sentience.
>
> >>> But this doesn't distinguish *all* humans from *all* nonhumans. How
> >>> many times do I have to repeat *that*?
>
> >> You never even have to think it again, it has been dispelled by an
> >> alternative way of approaching the whole subject of moral beings.
> >> "THE MORAL STATUS OF BEINGS WHO ARE NOT PERSONS;
> >> A CASUISTIC ARGUMENT "
>
> > Yes, I know you're impressed by that essay. I'm not impressed by that
> > part of it, as it stands. I don't find the explanation of the crucial
> > notion of "capacity" to be anything approaching adequate.
>
> Why not? *Just because it doesn't fit with what you want to believe?
>
> You /could/ learn what it is, but you're too lazy and self-absorbed for
> it. *Here's a start:
>
> * * * "Thus, asked whether she can multiply two digit numbers, a child
> * * * who at present can only multiply one-digit numbers may say that
> * * * she cannot do so at present (ability), but that she is sure she
> * * * could learn to do so if properly instructed (capability)."
>

Where's this from? Is this from Jon Wetlesen's essay?

> >> The class of beings called "moral persons" satisfies this objection. No
> >> non-human possesses the inherent capacity to be a moral agent or to
> >> display the other markers for advanced intelligence and sentience. You
> >> have tried to hang your hat on a supposed lack of clarity of the word
> >> "capacity",
>
> > Pretty much no attempt has been made to explain this crucial concept.
>
> Bullshit. *You're just too ****ing lazy to go find it. *I found it, and
> I don't pretend to be a specialist.
>

In order for Wetlesen's argument to be a successful rebuttal of the
AMC, he has to argue that there is at least a possibility that a
permanently severely retarded human being possesses the capability for
moral agency. What you have said so far doesn't explain what the
meaning of this is. Nor is the explanation to be found anywhere in
Wetlesen's essay.

> > He's saying there's some property that all humans have and no
> > nonhumans have.
>
> No, he isn't. *He isn't saying what all humans have at all.
>
> > Fine, then it's his burden to state what it is.
>
> Except that he's not saying it.
>
> > He hasn't even begun to embark on this task.
>
> Nor will he - he doesn't need to do so.
>

He acknowledges that in order to rebut the AMC he needs to identify
some property that marginal humans have and nonhumans lack, and that
it is his burden to identify this property. My remark was correct.

>
>
> >> but that objection is weak and has not been put forth. In
> >> fact capacity is a transparent concept, an acorn possesses the capacity
> >> to become an oak tree, a fertile egg possesses the capacity to be a
> >> chicken, a baby human and a person in a coma possess the capacity to
> >> become a moral agent.
>
> > That sounds like by "capacity" you mean "potential ability", which he
> > explicitly disavows.
>
> No, he doesn't. *Stop lying about what he wrote.
>

I'm not.

"However, a subject may have the capabilities of moral agency without
having the operative abilities. In that case the subject is a moral
person without being a moral agent, since moral personhood is grounded
on the actual capability and not on the potential ability." From
Wetlesen's essay, in the section "A rebuttal of the argument from
marginal cases".

Please don't accuse other people of lying when you have no rational
foundation for this accusation.

> > And "potential ability" won't cover the cases
> > where the human is permanently impaired.
>
> He addresses that separately.

No, his claim is that even a permanently impaired human may have the
capability for moral agency. This is crucial to his attempted rebuttal
of the AMC.

Have you read the essay?

On Apr 25, 11:46*pm, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 4/25/2012 1:19 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 25, 7:11 pm, George > *wrote:
> >> On 4/25/2012 5:30 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>> On Apr 24, 7:52 am, George > * *wrote:
> >>>> On 7/30/2007 7:07 AM, pearl wrote:
>
> >>>>> ANIMAL RIGHTS BILL 1 - Tom Regan speaks.
> >>>>> Video (8.38 minutes)
> >>>>>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ADhNch30Img
>
> >>>> Regan says, *"They [animals] are not only in the world, they are aware
> >>>> of it, and also what happens to them." *Bullshit. *Animals are *not*
> >>>> aware that they are in the world, they don't even know there's a world,
> >>>> and they have no concept whatever of any "fate" in store for them.
>
> >>> The claim is that animals are aware of the world. To quote Ludwig
> >>> Wittgenstein, "The world is everything that is the case."
>
> >> Sophistry.
>
> > What, what Ludwig Wittgenstein said? How would you define the world,
> > thenm?
>
> >>> Animals are
> >>> aware of some aspects of reality. They are not aware of the existence
> >>> of the planet earth or the universe, and they are not able to think at
> >>> a sufficient level of abstraction to be able to think to themselves
> >>> "The world is everything that is the case", but they are aware of some
> >>> aspects of reality, and that is enough for the claim to be true.
>
> >> Animals are not aware that they exist *in* reality. *No animal
> >> contemplates in any way the relationship between itself and the rest of
> >> reality.
>
> > The claim was that they are aware of the world. All that it takes for
> > this claim to be true is for them to be aware of some aspects of
> > reality.
>
> No, that's wrong.

It's not. I am correctly interpreting what Regan meant (quite
obviously).

> *Aspects of reality are not reality itself. *The tale
> of the six blind men and the elephant ought to tell you that.
>
> >>>> Regan: *"And what happens to them matters to them." *Wrong.
>
> >>> Actually, it is very obviously true.
>
> >> No, it is very obviously false. **Nothing* matters to them.
>
> > These claims are quite absurd.
>
> They're not. *They're correct. *Because:
>
>
>
> >> "Matters to them" is completely alien to animal mentation.
>
> Because of that.
>

There is some evidence that some nonhuman animals do have that
concept, and in any event the claim that nothing matters to animals
obviously doesn't follow from that at all, and is obvious nonsense.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >>>> "Like us, they bring a unified psychological presence to the world."
> >>>> Bullshit - pure mealymouthed psychobabble.
>
> >>> It's not bullshit.
>
> >> It's unadulterated bullshit.

On 4/26/2012 6:56 AM, Rupert wrote:
> On Apr 26, 5:59 am, George > wrote:
>> On 7/26/2007 5:02 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Jul 26, 6:06 pm, > wrote:
>>>> Rupert wrote:
>>>>> On Jul 6, 5:41 pm, > wrote:
>>>>>>> That's not the meaning of "discrimination" we're talking about here.
>>>>>>> We're saying that, if you make different moral judgements about two
>>>>>>> different cases, you're under an obligation to specify a morally
>>>>>>> relevant difference between them.
>>>>>> How many times do I have to repeat this? The chief morally relevant
>>>>>> differences between humans and non-humans, in fact among all organisms, are
>>>>>> intelligence and sentience.
>>
>>>>> But this doesn't distinguish *all* humans from *all* nonhumans. How
>>>>> many times do I have to repeat *that*?
>>
>>>> You never even have to think it again, it has been dispelled by an
>>>> alternative way of approaching the whole subject of moral beings.
>>>> "THE MORAL STATUS OF BEINGS WHO ARE NOT PERSONS;
>>>> A CASUISTIC ARGUMENT "
>>
>>> Yes, I know you're impressed by that essay. I'm not impressed by that
>>> part of it, as it stands. I don't find the explanation of the crucial
>>> notion of "capacity" to be anything approaching adequate.
>>
>> Why not? Just because it doesn't fit with what you want to believe?
>>
>> You /could/ learn what it is, but you're too lazy and self-absorbed for
>> it. Here's a start:
>>
>> "Thus, asked whether she can multiply two digit numbers, a child
>> who at present can only multiply one-digit numbers may say that
>> she cannot do so at present (ability), but that she is sure she
>> could learn to do so if properly instructed (capability)."
>>
>
> Where's this from? Is this from Jon Wetlesen's essay?

What the **** difference does it make where it's from, you ****ing
retard? It illustrates the difference between ability and capability.
You may no longer try to be evasive on that issue.


>
>>>> The class of beings called "moral persons" satisfies this objection. No
>>>> non-human possesses the inherent capacity to be a moral agent or to
>>>> display the other markers for advanced intelligence and sentience. You
>>>> have tried to hang your hat on a supposed lack of clarity of the word
>>>> "capacity",
>>
>>> Pretty much no attempt has been made to explain this crucial concept.
>>
>> Bullshit. You're just too ****ing lazy to go find it. I found it, and
>> I don't pretend to be a specialist.
>>
>
> In order for Wetlesen's argument to be a successful rebuttal of the
> AMC, he has to argue that there is at least a possibility that a
> permanently severely retarded human being possesses the capability for
> moral agency.

No, he doesn't. You show that you *still* don't understand that fully
equal moral considerability is *NOT* dependent on some individual
property possessed by the person. You just don't get it.

You and the other AMC-addicts just don't get it.


>>> He's saying there's some property that all humans have and no
>>> nonhumans have.
>>
>> No, he isn't. He isn't saying what all humans have at all.
>>
>>> Fine, then it's his burden to state what it is.
>>
>> Except that he's not saying it.
>>
>>> He hasn't even begun to embark on this task.
>>
>> Nor will he - he doesn't need to do so.
>>
>
> He acknowledges that in order to rebut the AMC he needs to identify
> some property that marginal humans have and nonhumans lack,

Where does he acknowledge that? Show us.

You're *still* stuck on this idea of *individuals*, and that's simply wrong.

On 4/26/2012 6:58 AM, Rupert wrote:
> On Apr 25, 11:46 pm, George > wrote:
>> On 4/25/2012 1:19 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Apr 25, 7:11 pm, George > wrote:
>>>> On 4/25/2012 5:30 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>> On Apr 24, 7:52 am, George > wrote:
>>>>>> On 7/30/2007 7:07 AM, pearl wrote:
>>
>>>>>>> ANIMAL RIGHTS BILL 1 - Tom Regan speaks.
>>>>>>> Video (8.38 minutes)
>>>>>>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ADhNch30Img
>>
>>>>>> Regan says, "They [animals] are not only in the world, they are aware
>>>>>> of it, and also what happens to them." Bullshit. Animals are *not*
>>>>>> aware that they are in the world, they don't even know there's a world,
>>>>>> and they have no concept whatever of any "fate" in store for them.
>>
>>>>> The claim is that animals are aware of the world. To quote Ludwig
>>>>> Wittgenstein, "The world is everything that is the case."
>>
>>>> Sophistry.
>>
>>> What, what Ludwig Wittgenstein said? How would you define the world,
>>> thenm?
>>
>>>>> Animals are
>>>>> aware of some aspects of reality. They are not aware of the existence
>>>>> of the planet earth or the universe, and they are not able to think at
>>>>> a sufficient level of abstraction to be able to think to themselves
>>>>> "The world is everything that is the case", but they are aware of some
>>>>> aspects of reality, and that is enough for the claim to be true.
>>
>>>> Animals are not aware that they exist *in* reality. No animal
>>>> contemplates in any way the relationship between itself and the rest of
>>>> reality.
>>
>>> The claim was that they are aware of the world. All that it takes for
>>> this claim to be true is for them to be aware of some aspects of
>>> reality.
>>
>> No, that's wrong.
>
> It's not.

It is.


> I am correctly interpreting what Regan meant (quite obviously).

Regan got it wrong, too, so you're following him in his error.


>
>> Aspects of reality are not reality itself. The tale
>> of the six blind men and the elephant ought to tell you that.
>>
>>>>>> Regan: "And what happens to them matters to them." Wrong.
>>
>>>>> Actually, it is very obviously true.
>>
>>>> No, it is very obviously false. *Nothing* matters to them.
>>
>>> These claims are quite absurd.
>>
>> They're not. They're correct. Because:
>>
>>
>>
>>>> "Matters to them" is completely alien to animal mentation.
>>
>> Because of that.
>>
>
> There is some evidence that some nonhuman animals do have that
> concept,

There isn't.


> and in any event the claim that nothing matters to animals
> obviously doesn't follow from that at all, and is obvious nonsense.

Wrong. What you ****wits are doing is substituting your judgment for
what "matters" in place of a non-existent judgment by animals; that is,
you're saying *as a human* that if you were an animal, certain things
would "matter" to you. That's bullshit - completely specious.

On Apr 26, 11:28*am, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 4/26/2012 6:58 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 25, 11:46 pm, George > *wrote:
> >> On 4/25/2012 1:19 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>> On Apr 25, 7:11 pm, George > * *wrote:
> >>>> On 4/25/2012 5:30 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>> On Apr 24, 7:52 am, George > * * *wrote:
> >>>>>> On 7/30/2007 7:07 AM, pearl wrote:
>
> >>>>>>> ANIMAL RIGHTS BILL 1 - Tom Regan speaks.
> >>>>>>> Video (8.38 minutes)
> >>>>>>>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ADhNch30Img
>
> >>>>>> Regan says, *"They [animals] are not only in the world, they are aware
> >>>>>> of it, and also what happens to them." *Bullshit. *Animals are *not*
> >>>>>> aware that they are in the world, they don't even know there's a world,
> >>>>>> and they have no concept whatever of any "fate" in store for them.
>
> >>>>> The claim is that animals are aware of the world. To quote Ludwig
> >>>>> Wittgenstein, "The world is everything that is the case."
>
> >>>> Sophistry.
>
> >>> What, what Ludwig Wittgenstein said? How would you define the world,
> >>> thenm?
>
> >>>>> Animals are
> >>>>> aware of some aspects of reality. They are not aware of the existence
> >>>>> of the planet earth or the universe, and they are not able to think at
> >>>>> a sufficient level of abstraction to be able to think to themselves
> >>>>> "The world is everything that is the case", but they are aware of some
> >>>>> aspects of reality, and that is enough for the claim to be true.
>
> >>>> Animals are not aware that they exist *in* reality. *No animal
> >>>> contemplates in any way the relationship between itself and the rest of
> >>>> reality.
>
> >>> The claim was that they are aware of the world. All that it takes for
> >>> this claim to be true is for them to be aware of some aspects of
> >>> reality.
>
> >> No, that's wrong.
>
> > It's not.
>
> It is.
>
> > I am correctly interpreting what Regan meant (quite obviously).
>
> Regan got it wrong, too, so you're following him in his error.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >> * Aspects of reality are not reality itself. *The tale
> >> of the six blind men and the elephant ought to tell you that.
>
> >>>>>> Regan: *"And what happens to them matters to them." *Wrong.
>
> >>>>> Actually, it is very obviously true.
>
> >>>> No, it is very obviously false. **Nothing* matters to them.
>
> >>> These claims are quite absurd.
>
> >> They're not. *They're correct. *Because:
>
> >>>> "Matters to them" is completely alien to animal mentation.
>
> >> Because of that.
>
> > There is some evidence that some nonhuman animals do have that
> > concept,
>
> There isn't.
>
> > and in any event the claim that nothing matters to animals
> > obviously doesn't follow from that at all, and is obvious nonsense.
>
> Wrong. *What you ****wits are doing is substituting your judgment for
> what "matters" in place of a non-existent judgment by animals; that is,
> you're saying *as a human* that if you were an animal, certain things
> would "matter" to you. *That's bullshit - completely specious.

So animals are just animated pieces of meat?

On Apr 26, 5:53*pm, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 4/26/2012 6:56 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 26, 5:59 am, George > *wrote:
> >> On 7/26/2007 5:02 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>> On Jul 26, 6:06 pm, > * *wrote:
> >>>> Rupert wrote:
> >>>>> On Jul 6, 5:41 pm, > * *wrote:
> >>>>>>> That's not the meaning of "discrimination" we're talking about here.
> >>>>>>> We're saying that, if you make different moral judgements about two
> >>>>>>> different cases, you're under an obligation to specify a morally
> >>>>>>> relevant difference between them.
> >>>>>> How many times do I have to repeat this? The chief morally relevant
> >>>>>> differences between humans and non-humans, in fact among all organisms, are
> >>>>>> intelligence and sentience.
>
> >>>>> But this doesn't distinguish *all* humans from *all* nonhumans. How
> >>>>> many times do I have to repeat *that*?
>
> >>>> You never even have to think it again, it has been dispelled by an
> >>>> alternative way of approaching the whole subject of moral beings.
> >>>> "THE MORAL STATUS OF BEINGS WHO ARE NOT PERSONS;
> >>>> A CASUISTIC ARGUMENT "
>
> >>> Yes, I know you're impressed by that essay. I'm not impressed by that
> >>> part of it, as it stands. I don't find the explanation of the crucial
> >>> notion of "capacity" to be anything approaching adequate.
>
> >> Why not? *Just because it doesn't fit with what you want to believe?
>
> >> You /could/ learn what it is, but you're too lazy and self-absorbed for
> >> it. *Here's a start:
>
> >> * * * *"Thus, asked whether she can multiply two digit numbers, a child
> >> * * * *who at present can only multiply one-digit numbers may say that
> >> * * * *she cannot do so at present (ability), but that she is sure she
> >> * * * *could learn to do so if properly instructed (capability)."
>
> > Where's this from? Is this from Jon Wetlesen's essay?
>
> What the **** difference does it make where it's from, you ****ing
> retard? *It illustrates the difference between ability and capability.
> You may no longer try to be evasive on that issue.
>

It illustrates *one* possible distinction that might be made between
abilty and capability, which is probably different to what Wetlesen
had in mind because Wetlesen explicitly denied that capability meant
the same thing as potential ability.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >>>> The class of beings called "moral persons" satisfies this objection. No
> >>>> non-human possesses the inherent capacity to be a moral agent or to
> >>>> display the other markers for advanced intelligence and sentience. You
> >>>> have tried to hang your hat on a supposed lack of clarity of the word
> >>>> "capacity",
>
> >>> Pretty much no attempt has been made to explain this crucial concept.
>
> >> Bullshit. *You're just too ****ing lazy to go find it. *I found it, and
> >> I don't pretend to be a specialist.
>
> > In order for Wetlesen's argument to be a successful rebuttal of the
> > AMC, he has to argue that there is at least a possibility that a
> > permanently severely retarded human being possesses the capability for
> > moral agency.
>
> No, he doesn't. *You show that you *still* don't understand that fully
> equal moral considerability is *NOT* dependent on some individual
> property possessed by the person. *You just don't get it.
>

Wetlesen *does* agree with me that it must be dependent on some
individual property, because he accepts the formal principle of
justice. You ought to read his essay.

> You and the other AMC-addicts just don't get it.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >>> He's saying there's some property that all humans have and no
> >>> nonhumans have.
>
> >> No, he isn't. *He isn't saying what all humans have at all.
>
> >>> Fine, then it's his burden to state what it is.
>
> >> Except that he's not saying it.
>
> >>> He hasn't even begun to embark on this task.
>
> >> Nor will he - he doesn't need to do so.
>
> > He acknowledges that in order to rebut the AMC he needs to identify
> > some property that marginal humans have and nonhumans lack,
>
> Where does he acknowledge that? *Show us.
>
> You're *still* stuck on this idea of *individuals*, and that's simply wrong.

"According to the present argument, inherent value is ascribed equally
to all moral persons. Hence this position is universalistic and
egalitarian. If this way of understanding the relation between moral
persons and moral agents works, there will be no need to distinguish
Agent's Rights and Human Rights the way Warren does. They will be
grounded in the same internal property of moral persons, and there
will be no need for a supplementary justification based on an external
relation such as membership in a human society.

The second consequence which follows from this position is that there
will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings,
which can justify a differential treatment with regard to the
ascription of moral status. Humans have a property which other animals
lack, notably the capability of being moral agents, and if this
property is accepted to be a necessary condition for the ascription of
moral status, then its absence in other animals will be a sufficient
condition for denying moral status to them."

(It should be noted that later in the essay Wetlesen in fact argues
that all individual biological organisms have moral status, and
speculates that ethical vegetarianism may be obligatory on these
grounds, because of a duty to do the least possible harm.)

Wetlesen most definitely agrees that the moral status of individuals
should be grounded in individual internal or relational properties
that they have. This is clear when you read his essay. You should
understand the argument and the way it differs from the ASN before
rushing to its defence.

On Apr 26, 7:28*pm, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 4/26/2012 6:58 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 25, 11:46 pm, George > *wrote:
> >> On 4/25/2012 1:19 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>> On Apr 25, 7:11 pm, George > * *wrote:
> >>>> On 4/25/2012 5:30 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>> On Apr 24, 7:52 am, George > * * *wrote:
> >>>>>> On 7/30/2007 7:07 AM, pearl wrote:
>
> >>>>>>> ANIMAL RIGHTS BILL 1 - Tom Regan speaks.
> >>>>>>> Video (8.38 minutes)
> >>>>>>>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ADhNch30Img
>
> >>>>>> Regan says, *"They [animals] are not only in the world, they are aware
> >>>>>> of it, and also what happens to them." *Bullshit. *Animals are *not*
> >>>>>> aware that they are in the world, they don't even know there's a world,
> >>>>>> and they have no concept whatever of any "fate" in store for them.
>
> >>>>> The claim is that animals are aware of the world. To quote Ludwig
> >>>>> Wittgenstein, "The world is everything that is the case."
>
> >>>> Sophistry.
>
> >>> What, what Ludwig Wittgenstein said? How would you define the world,
> >>> thenm?
>
> >>>>> Animals are
> >>>>> aware of some aspects of reality. They are not aware of the existence
> >>>>> of the planet earth or the universe, and they are not able to think at
> >>>>> a sufficient level of abstraction to be able to think to themselves
> >>>>> "The world is everything that is the case", but they are aware of some
> >>>>> aspects of reality, and that is enough for the claim to be true.
>
> >>>> Animals are not aware that they exist *in* reality. *No animal
> >>>> contemplates in any way the relationship between itself and the rest of
> >>>> reality.
>
> >>> The claim was that they are aware of the world. All that it takes for
> >>> this claim to be true is for them to be aware of some aspects of
> >>> reality.
>
> >> No, that's wrong.
>
> > It's not.
>
> It is.
>
> > I am correctly interpreting what Regan meant (quite obviously).
>
> Regan got it wrong, too, so you're following him in his error.
>

You're claiming he misused language?

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >> * Aspects of reality are not reality itself. *The tale
> >> of the six blind men and the elephant ought to tell you that.
>
> >>>>>> Regan: *"And what happens to them matters to them." *Wrong.
>
> >>>>> Actually, it is very obviously true.
>
> >>>> No, it is very obviously false. **Nothing* matters to them.
>
> >>> These claims are quite absurd.
>
> >> They're not. *They're correct. *Because:
>
> >>>> "Matters to them" is completely alien to animal mentation.
>
> >> Because of that.
>
> > There is some evidence that some nonhuman animals do have that
> > concept,
>
> There isn't.
>

Yes, there is, based on observation of primates like Koko the gorilla
who have been taught sign language, and observations of empathy and
altruism even in completely nonlinguistic nonhuman animals. But that's
neither here nor there.

> > and in any event the claim that nothing matters to animals
> > obviously doesn't follow from that at all, and is obvious nonsense.
>
> Wrong. *What you ****wits are doing is substituting your judgment for
> what "matters" in place of a non-existent judgment by animals; that is,
> you're saying *as a human* that if you were an animal, certain things
> would "matter" to you. *That's bullshit - completely specious.

Of course certain things matter to animals, you fool. It matters to an
animal whether or not he or she gets enough to eat.

On 4/26/2012 10:25 PM, Rupert wrote:
> On Apr 26, 5:53 pm, George > wrote:
>> On 4/26/2012 6:56 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Apr 26, 5:59 am, George > wrote:
>>>> On 7/26/2007 5:02 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>> On Jul 26, 6:06 pm, > wrote:
>>>>>> Rupert wrote:
>>>>>>> On Jul 6, 5:41 pm, > wrote:
>>>>>>>>> That's not the meaning of "discrimination" we're talking about here.
>>>>>>>>> We're saying that, if you make different moral judgements about two
>>>>>>>>> different cases, you're under an obligation to specify a morally
>>>>>>>>> relevant difference between them.
>>>>>>>> How many times do I have to repeat this? The chief morally relevant
>>>>>>>> differences between humans and non-humans, in fact among all organisms, are
>>>>>>>> intelligence and sentience.
>>
>>>>>>> But this doesn't distinguish *all* humans from *all* nonhumans. How
>>>>>>> many times do I have to repeat *that*?
>>
>>>>>> You never even have to think it again, it has been dispelled by an
>>>>>> alternative way of approaching the whole subject of moral beings.
>>>>>> "THE MORAL STATUS OF BEINGS WHO ARE NOT PERSONS;
>>>>>> A CASUISTIC ARGUMENT "
>>
>>>>> Yes, I know you're impressed by that essay. I'm not impressed by that
>>>>> part of it, as it stands. I don't find the explanation of the crucial
>>>>> notion of "capacity" to be anything approaching adequate.
>>
>>>> Why not? Just because it doesn't fit with what you want to believe?
>>
>>>> You /could/ learn what it is, but you're too lazy and self-absorbed for
>>>> it. Here's a start:
>>
>>>> "Thus, asked whether she can multiply two digit numbers, a child
>>>> who at present can only multiply one-digit numbers may say that
>>>> she cannot do so at present (ability), but that she is sure she
>>>> could learn to do so if properly instructed (capability)."
>>
>>> Where's this from? Is this from Jon Wetlesen's essay?
>>
>> What the **** difference does it make where it's from, you ****ing
>> retard? It illustrates the difference between ability and capability.
>> You may no longer try to be evasive on that issue.
>>
>
> It illustrates *one* possible distinction that might be made between
> abilty and capability, which is probably different to what Wetlesen
> had in mind because Wetlesen explicitly denied that capability meant
> the same thing as potential ability.
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>>>> The class of beings called "moral persons" satisfies this objection. No
>>>>>> non-human possesses the inherent capacity to be a moral agent or to
>>>>>> display the other markers for advanced intelligence and sentience. You
>>>>>> have tried to hang your hat on a supposed lack of clarity of the word
>>>>>> "capacity",
>>
>>>>> Pretty much no attempt has been made to explain this crucial concept.
>>
>>>> Bullshit. You're just too ****ing lazy to go find it. I found it, and
>>>> I don't pretend to be a specialist.
>>
>>> In order for Wetlesen's argument to be a successful rebuttal of the
>>> AMC, he has to argue that there is at least a possibility that a
>>> permanently severely retarded human being possesses the capability for
>>> moral agency.
>>
>> No, he doesn't. You show that you *still* don't understand that fully
>> equal moral considerability is *NOT* dependent on some individual
>> property possessed by the person. You just don't get it.
>>
>
> Wetlesen *does* agree with me that it must be dependent on some
> individual property, because he accepts the formal principle of
> justice. You ought to read his essay.
>
>> You and the other AMC-addicts just don't get it.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>>> He's saying there's some property that all humans have and no
>>>>> nonhumans have.
>>
>>>> No, he isn't. He isn't saying what all humans have at all.
>>
>>>>> Fine, then it's his burden to state what it is.
>>
>>>> Except that he's not saying it.
>>
>>>>> He hasn't even begun to embark on this task.
>>
>>>> Nor will he - he doesn't need to do so.
>>
>>> He acknowledges that in order to rebut the AMC he needs to identify
>>> some property that marginal humans have and nonhumans lack,
>>
>> Where does he acknowledge that? Show us.
>>
>> You're *still* stuck on this idea of *individuals*, and that's simply wrong.
>
> "According to the present argument, inherent value is ascribed equally
> to all moral persons. Hence this position is universalistic and
> egalitarian. If this way of understanding the relation between moral
> persons and moral agents works, there will be no need to distinguish
> Agent's Rights and Human Rights the way Warren does. They will be
> grounded in the same internal property of moral persons, and there
> will be no need for a supplementary justification based on an external
> relation such as membership in a human society.
>
> The second consequence which follows from this position is that there
> will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings,

Yes - but not at an individual level that one measures and votes on.

On 4/26/2012 10:27 PM, Rupert wrote:
> On Apr 26, 7:28 pm, George > wrote:
>> On 4/26/2012 6:58 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Apr 25, 11:46 pm, George > wrote:
>>>> On 4/25/2012 1:19 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>> On Apr 25, 7:11 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/25/2012 5:30 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>> On Apr 24, 7:52 am, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 7/30/2007 7:07 AM, pearl wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>> ANIMAL RIGHTS BILL 1 - Tom Regan speaks.
>>>>>>>>> Video (8.38 minutes)
>>>>>>>>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ADhNch30Img
>>
>>>>>>>> Regan says, "They [animals] are not only in the world, they are aware
>>>>>>>> of it, and also what happens to them." Bullshit. Animals are *not*
>>>>>>>> aware that they are in the world, they don't even know there's a world,
>>>>>>>> and they have no concept whatever of any "fate" in store for them.
>>
>>>>>>> The claim is that animals are aware of the world. To quote Ludwig
>>>>>>> Wittgenstein, "The world is everything that is the case."
>>
>>>>>> Sophistry.
>>
>>>>> What, what Ludwig Wittgenstein said? How would you define the world,
>>>>> thenm?
>>
>>>>>>> Animals are
>>>>>>> aware of some aspects of reality. They are not aware of the existence
>>>>>>> of the planet earth or the universe, and they are not able to think at
>>>>>>> a sufficient level of abstraction to be able to think to themselves
>>>>>>> "The world is everything that is the case", but they are aware of some
>>>>>>> aspects of reality, and that is enough for the claim to be true.
>>
>>>>>> Animals are not aware that they exist *in* reality. No animal
>>>>>> contemplates in any way the relationship between itself and the rest of
>>>>>> reality.
>>
>>>>> The claim was that they are aware of the world. All that it takes for
>>>>> this claim to be true is for them to be aware of some aspects of
>>>>> reality.
>>
>>>> No, that's wrong.
>>
>>> It's not.
>>
>> It is.
>>
>>> I am correctly interpreting what Regan meant (quite obviously).
>>
>> Regan got it wrong, too, so you're following him in his error.
>>
>
> You're claiming he misused language?

I'm claiming that Regan is wrong to say that being aware of some aspects
of reality is to be aware of reality.


>>
>>>> Aspects of reality are not reality itself. The tale
>>>> of the six blind men and the elephant ought to tell you that.
>>
>>>>>>>> Regan: "And what happens to them matters to them." Wrong.
>>
>>>>>>> Actually, it is very obviously true.
>>
>>>>>> No, it is very obviously false. *Nothing* matters to them.
>>
>>>>> These claims are quite absurd.
>>
>>>> They're not. They're correct. Because:
>>
>>>>>> "Matters to them" is completely alien to animal mentation.
>>
>>>> Because of that.
>>
>>> There is some evidence that some nonhuman animals do have that
>>> concept,
>>
>> There isn't.
>>
>
> Yes, there is, based on observation of primates like Koko the gorilla
> who have been taught sign language,

Does not demonstrate that anything "matters to her."


>>> and in any event the claim that nothing matters to animals
>>> obviously doesn't follow from that at all, and is obvious nonsense.
>>
>> Wrong. What you ****wits are doing is substituting your judgment for
>> what "matters" in place of a non-existent judgment by animals; that is,
>> you're saying *as a human* that if you were an animal, certain things
>> would "matter" to you. That's bullshit - completely specious.
>
> Of course certain things matter to animals,

No.

On Apr 27, 8:32*am, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 4/26/2012 10:25 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 26, 5:53 pm, George > *wrote:
> >> On 4/26/2012 6:56 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>> On Apr 26, 5:59 am, George > * *wrote:
> >>>> On 7/26/2007 5:02 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>> On Jul 26, 6:06 pm, > * * *wrote:
> >>>>>> Rupert wrote:
> >>>>>>> On Jul 6, 5:41 pm, > * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>> That's not the meaning of "discrimination" we're talking about here.
> >>>>>>>>> We're saying that, if you make different moral judgements about two
> >>>>>>>>> different cases, you're under an obligation to specify a morally
> >>>>>>>>> relevant difference between them.
> >>>>>>>> How many times do I have to repeat this? The chief morally relevant
> >>>>>>>> differences between humans and non-humans, in fact among all organisms, are
> >>>>>>>> intelligence and sentience.
>
> >>>>>>> But this doesn't distinguish *all* humans from *all* nonhumans. How
> >>>>>>> many times do I have to repeat *that*?
>
> >>>>>> You never even have to think it again, it has been dispelled by an
> >>>>>> alternative way of approaching the whole subject of moral beings.
> >>>>>> "THE MORAL STATUS OF BEINGS WHO ARE NOT PERSONS;
> >>>>>> A CASUISTIC ARGUMENT "
>
> >>>>> Yes, I know you're impressed by that essay. I'm not impressed by that
> >>>>> part of it, as it stands. I don't find the explanation of the crucial
> >>>>> notion of "capacity" to be anything approaching adequate.
>
> >>>> Why not? *Just because it doesn't fit with what you want to believe?
>
> >>>> You /could/ learn what it is, but you're too lazy and self-absorbed for
> >>>> it. *Here's a start:
>
> >>>> * * * * "Thus, asked whether she can multiply two digit numbers, a child
> >>>> * * * * who at present can only multiply one-digit numbers may say that
> >>>> * * * * she cannot do so at present (ability), but that she is sure she
> >>>> * * * * could learn to do so if properly instructed (capability)."
>
> >>> Where's this from? Is this from Jon Wetlesen's essay?
>
> >> What the **** difference does it make where it's from, you ****ing
> >> retard? *It illustrates the difference between ability and capability.
> >> You may no longer try to be evasive on that issue.
>
> > It illustrates *one* possible distinction that might be made between
> > abilty and capability, which is probably different to what Wetlesen
> > had in mind because Wetlesen explicitly denied that capability meant
> > the same thing as potential ability.
>
> >>>>>> The class of beings called "moral persons" satisfies this objection. No
> >>>>>> non-human possesses the inherent capacity to be a moral agent or to
> >>>>>> display the other markers for advanced intelligence and sentience. You
> >>>>>> have tried to hang your hat on a supposed lack of clarity of the word
> >>>>>> "capacity",
>
> >>>>> Pretty much no attempt has been made to explain this crucial concept.

On Apr 27, 8:35*am, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 4/26/2012 10:27 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 26, 7:28 pm, George > *wrote:
> >> On 4/26/2012 6:58 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>> On Apr 25, 11:46 pm, George > * *wrote:
> >>>> On 4/25/2012 1:19 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>> On Apr 25, 7:11 pm, George > * * *wrote:
> >>>>>> On 4/25/2012 5:30 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>> On Apr 24, 7:52 am, George > * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>> On 7/30/2007 7:07 AM, pearl wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>> ANIMAL RIGHTS BILL 1 - Tom Regan speaks.
> >>>>>>>>> Video (8.38 minutes)
> >>>>>>>>>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ADhNch30Img
>
> >>>>>>>> Regan says, *"They [animals] are not only in the world, they are aware
> >>>>>>>> of it, and also what happens to them." *Bullshit. *Animals are *not*
> >>>>>>>> aware that they are in the world, they don't even know there's a world,
> >>>>>>>> and they have no concept whatever of any "fate" in store for them.
>
> >>>>>>> The claim is that animals are aware of the world. To quote Ludwig
> >>>>>>> Wittgenstein, "The world is everything that is the case."
>
> >>>>>> Sophistry.
>
> >>>>> What, what Ludwig Wittgenstein said? How would you define the world,
> >>>>> thenm?
>
> >>>>>>> Animals are
> >>>>>>> aware of some aspects of reality. They are not aware of the existence
> >>>>>>> of the planet earth or the universe, and they are not able to think at
> >>>>>>> a sufficient level of abstraction to be able to think to themselves
> >>>>>>> "The world is everything that is the case", but they are aware of some
> >>>>>>> aspects of reality, and that is enough for the claim to be true.
>
> >>>>>> Animals are not aware that they exist *in* reality. *No animal
> >>>>>> contemplates in any way the relationship between itself and the rest of
> >>>>>> reality.
>
> >>>>> The claim was that they are aware of the world. All that it takes for
> >>>>> this claim to be true is for them to be aware of some aspects of
> >>>>> reality.
>
> >>>> No, that's wrong.
>
> >>> It's not.
>
> >> It is.
>
> >>> I am correctly interpreting what Regan meant (quite obviously).
>
> >> Regan got it wrong, too, so you're following him in his error.
>
> > You're claiming he misused language?
>
> I'm claiming that Regan is wrong to say that being aware of some aspects
> of reality is to be aware of reality.
>

Claiming, as opposed to arguing the point.

Best of luck with that.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >>>> * *Aspects of reality are not reality itself. *The tale
> >>>> of the six blind men and the elephant ought to tell you that.
>
> >>>>>>>> Regan: *"And what happens to them matters to them." *Wrong.
>
> >>>>>>> Actually, it is very obviously true.
>
> >>>>>> No, it is very obviously false. **Nothing* matters to them.
>
> >>>>> These claims are quite absurd.
>
> >>>> They're not. *They're correct. *Because:
>
> >>>>>> "Matters to them" is completely alien to animal mentation.
>
> >>>> Because of that.
>
> >>> There is some evidence that some nonhuman animals do have that
> >>> concept,
>
> >> There isn't.
>
> > Yes, there is, based on observation of primates like Koko the gorilla
> > who have been taught sign language,
>
> Does not demonstrate that anything "matters to her."
>

Of course things matter to Koko, you fool.

Do you think that things mattered to your son when he was two years
old?

> >>> and in any event the claim that nothing matters to animals
> >>> obviously doesn't follow from that at all, and is obvious nonsense.
>
> >> Wrong. *What you ****wits are doing is substituting your judgment for
> >> what "matters" in place of a non-existent judgment by animals; that is,
> >> you're saying *as a human* that if you were an animal, certain things
> >> would "matter" to you. *That's bullshit - completely specious.
>
> > Of course certain things matter to animals,
>
> No.

You're an idiot.

On 4/27/2012 7:23 AM, Rupert wrote:
> On Apr 27, 8:32 am, George > wrote:
>> On 4/26/2012 10:25 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Apr 26, 5:53 pm, George > wrote:
>>>> On 4/26/2012 6:56 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>> On Apr 26, 5:59 am, George > wrote:
>>>>>> On 7/26/2007 5:02 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>> On Jul 26, 6:06 pm, > wrote:
>>>>>>>> Rupert wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On Jul 6, 5:41 pm, > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> That's not the meaning of "discrimination" we're talking about here.
>>>>>>>>>>> We're saying that, if you make different moral judgements about two
>>>>>>>>>>> different cases, you're under an obligation to specify a morally
>>>>>>>>>>> relevant difference between them.
>>>>>>>>>> How many times do I have to repeat this? The chief morally relevant
>>>>>>>>>> differences between humans and non-humans, in fact among all organisms, are
>>>>>>>>>> intelligence and sentience.
>>
>>>>>>>>> But this doesn't distinguish *all* humans from *all* nonhumans. How
>>>>>>>>> many times do I have to repeat *that*?
>>
>>>>>>>> You never even have to think it again, it has been dispelled by an
>>>>>>>> alternative way of approaching the whole subject of moral beings.
>>>>>>>> "THE MORAL STATUS OF BEINGS WHO ARE NOT PERSONS;
>>>>>>>> A CASUISTIC ARGUMENT "
>>
>>>>>>> Yes, I know you're impressed by that essay. I'm not impressed by that
>>>>>>> part of it, as it stands. I don't find the explanation of the crucial
>>>>>>> notion of "capacity" to be anything approaching adequate.
>>
>>>>>> Why not? Just because it doesn't fit with what you want to believe?
>>
>>>>>> You /could/ learn what it is, but you're too lazy and self-absorbed for
>>>>>> it. Here's a start:
>>
>>>>>> "Thus, asked whether she can multiply two digit numbers, a child
>>>>>> who at present can only multiply one-digit numbers may say that
>>>>>> she cannot do so at present (ability), but that she is sure she
>>>>>> could learn to do so if properly instructed (capability)."
>>
>>>>> Where's this from? Is this from Jon Wetlesen's essay?
>>
>>>> What the **** difference does it make where it's from, you ****ing
>>>> retard? It illustrates the difference between ability and capability.
>>>> You may no longer try to be evasive on that issue.
>>
>>> It illustrates *one* possible distinction that might be made between
>>> abilty and capability, which is probably different to what Wetlesen
>>> had in mind because Wetlesen explicitly denied that capability meant
>>> the same thing as potential ability.
>>
>>>>>>>> The class of beings called "moral persons" satisfies this objection. No
>>>>>>>> non-human possesses the inherent capacity to be a moral agent or to
>>>>>>>> display the other markers for advanced intelligence and sentience. You
>>>>>>>> have tried to hang your hat on a supposed lack of clarity of the word
>>>>>>>> "capacity",
>>
>>>>>>> Pretty much no attempt has been made to explain this crucial concept.
>>
>>>>>> Bullshit. You're just too ****ing lazy to go find it. I found it, and
>>>>>> I don't pretend to be a specialist.
>>
>>>>> In order for Wetlesen's argument to be a successful rebuttal of the
>>>>> AMC, he has to argue that there is at least a possibility that a
>>>>> permanently severely retarded human being possesses the capability for
>>>>> moral agency.
>>
>>>> No, he doesn't. You show that you *still* don't understand that fully
>>>> equal moral considerability is *NOT* dependent on some individual
>>>> property possessed by the person. You just don't get it.
>>
>>> Wetlesen *does* agree with me that it must be dependent on some
>>> individual property, because he accepts the formal principle of
>>> justice. You ought to read his essay.
>>
>>>> You and the other AMC-addicts just don't get it.
>>
>>>>>>> He's saying there's some property that all humans have and no
>>>>>>> nonhumans have.
>>
>>>>>> No, he isn't. He isn't saying what all humans have at all.
>>
>>>>>>> Fine, then it's his burden to state what it is.
>>
>>>>>> Except that he's not saying it.
>>
>>>>>>> He hasn't even begun to embark on this task.
>>
>>>>>> Nor will he - he doesn't need to do so.
>>
>>>>> He acknowledges that in order to rebut the AMC he needs to identify
>>>>> some property that marginal humans have and nonhumans lack,
>>
>>>> Where does he acknowledge that? Show us.
>>
>>>> You're *still* stuck on this idea of *individuals*, and that's simply wrong.
>>
>>> "According to the present argument, inherent value is ascribed equally
>>> to all moral persons. Hence this position is universalistic and
>>> egalitarian. If this way of understanding the relation between moral
>>> persons and moral agents works, there will be no need to distinguish
>>> Agent's Rights and Human Rights the way Warren does. They will be
>>> grounded in the same internal property of moral persons, and there
>>> will be no need for a supplementary justification based on an external
>>> relation such as membership in a human society.
>>
>>> The second consequence which follows from this position is that there
>>> will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings,
>>
>> Yes - but not at an individual level that one measures and votes on.
>
> Wetlesen obviously accepts that if one wants to give one individual
> moral status and deny it to another

Wetlesen isn't literally talking about "one" and "another". He's
talking about kinds.

On 4/27/2012 7:24 AM, Rupert wrote:
> On Apr 27, 8:35 am, George > wrote:
>> On 4/26/2012 10:27 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Apr 26, 7:28 pm, George > wrote:
>>>> On 4/26/2012 6:58 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>> On Apr 25, 11:46 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/25/2012 1:19 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>> On Apr 25, 7:11 pm, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/25/2012 5:30 AM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>> On Apr 24, 7:52 am, George > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 7/30/2007 7:07 AM, pearl wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>>>> ANIMAL RIGHTS BILL 1 - Tom Regan speaks.
>>>>>>>>>>> Video (8.38 minutes)
>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ADhNch30Img
>>
>>>>>>>>>> Regan says, "They [animals] are not only in the world, they are aware
>>>>>>>>>> of it, and also what happens to them." Bullshit. Animals are *not*
>>>>>>>>>> aware that they are in the world, they don't even know there's a world,
>>>>>>>>>> and they have no concept whatever of any "fate" in store for them.
>>
>>>>>>>>> The claim is that animals are aware of the world. To quote Ludwig
>>>>>>>>> Wittgenstein, "The world is everything that is the case."
>>
>>>>>>>> Sophistry.
>>
>>>>>>> What, what Ludwig Wittgenstein said? How would you define the world,
>>>>>>> thenm?
>>
>>>>>>>>> Animals are
>>>>>>>>> aware of some aspects of reality. They are not aware of the existence
>>>>>>>>> of the planet earth or the universe, and they are not able to think at
>>>>>>>>> a sufficient level of abstraction to be able to think to themselves
>>>>>>>>> "The world is everything that is the case", but they are aware of some
>>>>>>>>> aspects of reality, and that is enough for the claim to be true.
>>
>>>>>>>> Animals are not aware that they exist *in* reality. No animal
>>>>>>>> contemplates in any way the relationship between itself and the rest of
>>>>>>>> reality.
>>
>>>>>>> The claim was that they are aware of the world. All that it takes for
>>>>>>> this claim to be true is for them to be aware of some aspects of
>>>>>>> reality.
>>
>>>>>> No, that's wrong.
>>
>>>>> It's not.
>>
>>>> It is.
>>
>>>>> I am correctly interpreting what Regan meant (quite obviously).
>>
>>>> Regan got it wrong, too, so you're following him in his error.
>>
>>> You're claiming he misused language?
>>
>> I'm claiming that Regan is wrong to say that being aware of some aspects
>> of reality is to be aware of reality.
>>
>
> Claiming, as opposed to arguing the point.

He has the burden of proof, as usual, and as usual, he fails.

All of you fail, as a basic matter of logic. You fail because you are
assuming the very thing you must prove.


>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>>>> Aspects of reality are not reality itself. The tale
>>>>>> of the six blind men and the elephant ought to tell you that.
>>
>>>>>>>>>> Regan: "And what happens to them matters to them." Wrong.
>>
>>>>>>>>> Actually, it is very obviously true.
>>
>>>>>>>> No, it is very obviously false. *Nothing* matters to them.
>>
>>>>>>> These claims are quite absurd.
>>
>>>>>> They're not. They're correct. Because:
>>
>>>>>>>> "Matters to them" is completely alien to animal mentation.
>>
>>>>>> Because of that.
>>
>>>>> There is some evidence that some nonhuman animals do have that
>>>>> concept,
>>
>>>> There isn't.
>>
>>> Yes, there is, based on observation of primates like Koko the gorilla
>>> who have been taught sign language,
>>
>> Does not demonstrate that anything "matters to her."
>>
>
> Of course things matter to Koko,

They don't. She has no awareness that there is a world, that she will
some day no longer be in it.


>>>>> and in any event the claim that nothing matters to animals
>>>>> obviously doesn't follow from that at all, and is obvious nonsense.
>>
>>>> Wrong. What you ****wits are doing is substituting your judgment for
>>>> what "matters" in place of a non-existent judgment by animals; that is,
>>>> you're saying *as a human* that if you were an animal, certain things
>>>> would "matter" to you. That's bullshit - completely specious.
>>
>>> Of course certain things matter to animals,
>>
>> No.
>
> You're an idiot.

No.

On Apr 27, 5:34*pm, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 4/27/2012 7:23 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 27, 8:32 am, George > *wrote:
> >> On 4/26/2012 10:25 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>> On Apr 26, 5:53 pm, George > * *wrote:
> >>>> On 4/26/2012 6:56 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>> On Apr 26, 5:59 am, George > * * *wrote:
> >>>>>> On 7/26/2007 5:02 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>> On Jul 26, 6:06 pm, > * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>> Rupert wrote:
> >>>>>>>>> On Jul 6, 5:41 pm, > * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>> That's not the meaning of "discrimination" we're talking about here.
> >>>>>>>>>>> We're saying that, if you make different moral judgements about two
> >>>>>>>>>>> different cases, you're under an obligation to specify a morally
> >>>>>>>>>>> relevant difference between them.
> >>>>>>>>>> How many times do I have to repeat this? The chief morally relevant
> >>>>>>>>>> differences between humans and non-humans, in fact among all organisms, are
> >>>>>>>>>> intelligence and sentience.
>
> >>>>>>>>> But this doesn't distinguish *all* humans from *all* nonhumans. How
> >>>>>>>>> many times do I have to repeat *that*?
>
> >>>>>>>> You never even have to think it again, it has been dispelled by an
> >>>>>>>> alternative way of approaching the whole subject of moral beings..
> >>>>>>>> "THE MORAL STATUS OF BEINGS WHO ARE NOT PERSONS;
> >>>>>>>> A CASUISTIC ARGUMENT "
>
> >>>>>>> Yes, I know you're impressed by that essay. I'm not impressed by that
> >>>>>>> part of it, as it stands. I don't find the explanation of the crucial
> >>>>>>> notion of "capacity" to be anything approaching adequate.
>
> >>>>>> Why not? *Just because it doesn't fit with what you want to believe?
>
> >>>>>> You /could/ learn what it is, but you're too lazy and self-absorbed for
> >>>>>> it. *Here's a start:
>
> >>>>>> * * * * *"Thus, asked whether she can multiply two digit numbers, a child
> >>>>>> * * * * *who at present can only multiply one-digit numbers may say that
> >>>>>> * * * * *she cannot do so at present (ability), but that she is sure she
> >>>>>> * * * * *could learn to do so if properly instructed (capability)."
>
> >>>>> Where's this from? Is this from Jon Wetlesen's essay?
>
> >>>> What the **** difference does it make where it's from, you ****ing
> >>>> retard? *It illustrates the difference between ability and capability.
> >>>> You may no longer try to be evasive on that issue.
>
> >>> It illustrates *one* possible distinction that might be made between
> >>> abilty and capability, which is probably different to what Wetlesen
> >>> had in mind because Wetlesen explicitly denied that capability meant
> >>> the same thing as potential ability.
>
> >>>>>>>> The class of beings called "moral persons" satisfies this objection. No
> >>>>>>>> non-human possesses the inherent capacity to be a moral agent or to
> >>>>>>>> display the other markers for advanced intelligence and sentience. You
> >>>>>>>> have tried to hang your hat on a supposed lack of clarity of the word
> >>>>>>>> "capacity",
>
> >>>>>>> Pretty much no attempt has been made to explain this crucial concept.
>
> >>>>>> Bullshit. *You're just too ****ing lazy to go find it. *I found it, and
> >>>>>> I don't pretend to be a specialist.
>
> >>>>> In order for Wetlesen's argument to be a successful rebuttal of the
> >>>>> AMC, he has to argue that there is at least a possibility that a
> >>>>> permanently severely retarded human being possesses the capability for
> >>>>> moral agency.
>
> >>>> No, he doesn't. *You show that you *still* don't understand that fully
> >>>> equal moral considerability is *NOT* dependent on some individual
> >>>> property possessed by the person. *You just don't get it.
>
> >>> Wetlesen *does* agree with me that it must be dependent on some
> >>> individual property, because he accepts the formal principle of
> >>> justice. You ought to read his essay.
>
> >>>> You and the other AMC-addicts just don't get it.
>
> >>>>>>> He's saying there's some property that all humans have and no
> >>>>>>> nonhumans have.
>
> >>>>>> No, he isn't. *He isn't saying what all humans have at all.
>
> >>>>>>> Fine, then it's his burden to state what it is.
>
> >>>>>> Except that he's not saying it.
>
> >>>>>>> He hasn't even begun to embark on this task.
>
> >>>>>> Nor will he - he doesn't need to do so.
>
> >>>>> He acknowledges that in order to rebut the AMC he needs to identify
> >>>>> some property that marginal humans have and nonhumans lack,
>
> >>>> Where does he acknowledge that? *Show us.
>
> >>>> You're *still* stuck on this idea of *individuals*, and that's simply wrong.
>
> >>> "According to the present argument, inherent value is ascribed equally
> >>> to all moral persons. Hence this position is universalistic and
> >>> egalitarian. If this way of understanding the relation between moral
> >>> persons and moral agents works, there will be no need to distinguish
> >>> Agent's Rights and Human Rights the way Warren does. They will be
> >>> grounded in the same internal property of moral persons, and there
> >>> will be no need for a supplementary justification based on an external
> >>> relation such as membership in a human society.
>
> >>> The second consequence which follows from this position is that there
> >>> will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings,
>
> >> Yes - but not at an individual level that one measures and votes on.
>
> > Wetlesen obviously accepts that if one wants to give one individual
> > moral status and deny it to another
>
> Wetlesen isn't literally talking about "one" and "another". *He's
> talking about kinds.

No, it is clear from his essay that he is talking about individuals.

On Apr 27, 5:38*pm, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 4/27/2012 7:24 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 27, 8:35 am, George > *wrote:
> >> On 4/26/2012 10:27 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>> On Apr 26, 7:28 pm, George > * *wrote:
> >>>> On 4/26/2012 6:58 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>> On Apr 25, 11:46 pm, George > * * *wrote:
> >>>>>> On 4/25/2012 1:19 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>> On Apr 25, 7:11 pm, George > * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>> On 4/25/2012 5:30 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>> On Apr 24, 7:52 am, George > * * * * *wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>> On 7/30/2007 7:07 AM, pearl wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>>>> ANIMAL RIGHTS BILL 1 - Tom Regan speaks.
> >>>>>>>>>>> Video (8.38 minutes)
> >>>>>>>>>>>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ADhNch30Img
>
> >>>>>>>>>> Regan says, *"They [animals] are not only in the world, they are aware
> >>>>>>>>>> of it, and also what happens to them." *Bullshit. *Animals are *not*
> >>>>>>>>>> aware that they are in the world, they don't even know there's a world,
> >>>>>>>>>> and they have no concept whatever of any "fate" in store for them.
>
> >>>>>>>>> The claim is that animals are aware of the world. To quote Ludwig
> >>>>>>>>> Wittgenstein, "The world is everything that is the case."
>
> >>>>>>>> Sophistry.
>
> >>>>>>> What, what Ludwig Wittgenstein said? How would you define the world,
> >>>>>>> thenm?
>
> >>>>>>>>> Animals are
> >>>>>>>>> aware of some aspects of reality. They are not aware of the existence
> >>>>>>>>> of the planet earth or the universe, and they are not able to think at
> >>>>>>>>> a sufficient level of abstraction to be able to think to themselves
> >>>>>>>>> "The world is everything that is the case", but they are aware of some
> >>>>>>>>> aspects of reality, and that is enough for the claim to be true..
>
> >>>>>>>> Animals are not aware that they exist *in* reality. *No animal
> >>>>>>>> contemplates in any way the relationship between itself and the rest of
> >>>>>>>> reality.
>
> >>>>>>> The claim was that they are aware of the world. All that it takes for
> >>>>>>> this claim to be true is for them to be aware of some aspects of
> >>>>>>> reality.
>
> >>>>>> No, that's wrong.
>
> >>>>> It's not.
>
> >>>> It is.
>
> >>>>> I am correctly interpreting what Regan meant (quite obviously).
>
> >>>> Regan got it wrong, too, so you're following him in his error.
>
> >>> You're claiming he misused language?
>
> >> I'm claiming that Regan is wrong to say that being aware of some aspects
> >> of reality is to be aware of reality.
>
> > Claiming, as opposed to arguing the point.
>
> He has the burden of proof, as usual, and as usual, he fails.
>
> All of you fail, as a basic matter of logic. *You fail because you are
> assuming the very thing you must prove.
>

The statement was "Animals are aware of the world". The claim is that
in order for this to be true it is sufficient that animals be aware of
some aspects of reality. (This is my claim, not Regan's, but I am
confident that Regan would agree with me.)

This is quite obvious. To see that it is true one just has to be a
native speaker of the English language. I have no interest in trying
to educate you about what a perfectly ordinary English sentence means.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >>>>>> * * Aspects of reality are not reality itself. *The tale
> >>>>>> of the six blind men and the elephant ought to tell you that.
>
> >>>>>>>>>> Regan: *"And what happens to them matters to them." *Wrong..
>
> >>>>>>>>> Actually, it is very obviously true.
>
> >>>>>>>> No, it is very obviously false. **Nothing* matters to them.
>
> >>>>>>> These claims are quite absurd.
>
> >>>>>> They're not. *They're correct. *Because:
>
> >>>>>>>> "Matters to them" is completely alien to animal mentation.
>
> >>>>>> Because of that.
>
> >>>>> There is some evidence that some nonhuman animals do have that
> >>>>> concept,
>
> >>>> There isn't.
>
> >>> Yes, there is, based on observation of primates like Koko the gorilla
> >>> who have been taught sign language,
>
> >> Does not demonstrate that anything "matters to her."
>
> > Of course things matter to Koko,
>
> They don't. *She has no awareness that there is a world, that she will
> some day no longer be in it.
>

She does understand the concept of death, and she is aware of various
aspects of the world just as you and I are, and just as your son was
when he was two years old. She has similar linguistic and cognitive
abilities to your son at the age of two. It is extremely obvious that
things matter to her, and that she is aware of the world. She also has
some understanding of the concept of death, although she becomes
fidgety and uncomfortable when asked to discuss her own death. It is
not clear to what extent she is aware of her own mortality.

> >>>>> and in any event the claim that nothing matters to animals
> >>>>> obviously doesn't follow from that at all, and is obvious nonsense.
>
> >>>> Wrong. *What you ****wits are doing is substituting your judgment for
> >>>> what "matters" in place of a non-existent judgment by animals; that is,
> >>>> you're saying *as a human* that if you were an animal, certain things
> >>>> would "matter" to you. *That's bullshit - completely specious.
>
> >>> Of course certain things matter to animals,
>
> >> No.
>
> > You're an idiot.
>
> No.

"Rupert" > wrote

>> >>> Yes, there is, based on observation of primates like Koko the gorilla
>> >>> who have been taught sign language,
>>
>> >> Does not demonstrate that anything "matters to her."
>>
>> > Of course things matter to Koko,
>>
>> They don't. She has no awareness that there is a world, that she will
>> some day no longer be in it.
>>
>
> She does understand the concept of death,

On what do you base this?

> and she is aware of various
> aspects of the world just as you and I are

No, not like that, human awareness is not like non-human awareness. <I was
going to elaborate but I shouldn't have to>

> and just as your son was
> when he was two years old.

His son possessed the capability to become a PhD in mathematics or a great
philosopher or musician, the ape is permanently two years old.

> She has similar linguistic and cognitive
> abilities to your son at the age of two. It is extremely obvious that
> things matter to her, and that she is aware of the world. She also has
> some understanding of the concept of death, although she becomes
> fidgety and uncomfortable when asked to discuss her own death. It is
> not clear to what extent she is aware of her own mortality.

All unsupported supposition.

On Apr 27, 8:06*pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote
>
> >> >>> Yes, there is, based on observation of primates like Koko the gorilla
> >> >>> who have been taught sign language,
>
> >> >> Does not demonstrate that anything "matters to her."
>
> >> > Of course things matter to Koko,
>
> >> They don't. *She has no awareness that there is a world, that she will
> >> some day no longer be in it.
>
> > She does understand the concept of death,
>
> On what do you base this?
>

She has discussions about it with her caregivers.

> > and she is aware of various
> > aspects of the world just as you and I are
>
> No, not like that, human awareness is not like non-human awareness. <I was
> going to elaborate but I shouldn't have to>
>

I didn't say that her awareness was similar to ours in every respect.
I said it was a property we had in common, which is true. Also, her
awareness of the world is quite similar to what Ball's son's awareness
of the world was at the age of two.

> > and just as your son was
> > when he was two years old.
>
> His son possessed the capability to become a PhD in mathematics or a great
> philosopher or musician, the ape is permanently two years old.
>

I think Ball's son is retarded, isn't he?

Koko is learning the letters of the alphabet, she is not "permanently
two years old". She has less potential for cognitive development than
Ball's son, even if I am correct that Ball's son is retarded. So what?


> > She has similar linguistic and cognitive
> > abilities to your son at the age of two. It is extremely obvious that
> > things matter to her, and that she is aware of the world. She also has
> > some understanding of the concept of death, although she becomes
> > fidgety and uncomfortable when asked to discuss her own death. It is
> > not clear to what extent she is aware of her own mortality.
>
> All unsupported supposition.

No.

"Rupert" > wrote in message
...
> On Apr 27, 8:06 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
>> "Rupert" > wrote
>>
>> >> >>> Yes, there is, based on observation of primates like Koko the
>> >> >>> gorilla
>> >> >>> who have been taught sign language,
>>
>> >> >> Does not demonstrate that anything "matters to her."
>>
>> >> > Of course things matter to Koko,
>>
>> >> They don't. She has no awareness that there is a world, that she will
>> >> some day no longer be in it.
>>
>> > She does understand the concept of death,
>>
>> On what do you base this?
>>
>
> She has discussions about it with her caregivers.

They don't know what she is thinking, if anything.

>> > and she is aware of various
>> > aspects of the world just as you and I are
>>
>> No, not like that, human awareness is not like non-human awareness. <I
>> was
>> going to elaborate but I shouldn't have to>
>>
>
> I didn't say that her awareness was similar to ours in every respect.
> I said it was a property we had in common, which is true.

So what? Fruit flies are aware of various aspects of the world too.

> Also, her
> awareness of the world is quite similar to what Ball's son's awareness
> of the world was at the age of two.

So you repeat the AMC again and again, but that doesn't make it a valid
argument.
>
>> > and just as your son was
>> > when he was two years old.
>>
>> His son possessed the capability to become a PhD in mathematics or a
>> great
>> philosopher or musician, the ape is permanently two years old.
>>
>
> I think Ball's son is retarded, isn't he?
>
> Koko is learning the letters of the alphabet, she is not "permanently
> two years old". She has less potential for cognitive development than
> Ball's son, even if I am correct that Ball's son is retarded. So what?

Cognitively impaired humans may still possess the capability of higher
cognition, so we err on the safe side.


>> > She has similar linguistic and cognitive
>> > abilities to your son at the age of two. It is extremely obvious that
>> > things matter to her, and that she is aware of the world. She also has
>> > some understanding of the concept of death, although she becomes
>> > fidgety and uncomfortable when asked to discuss her own death. It is
>> > not clear to what extent she is aware of her own mortality.
>>
>> All unsupported supposition.
>
> No.
Yes, the interpretations of her trainers have been discredited by other
researchers. She mimics them.

On Apr 28, 1:00*pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> "Rupert" > wrote in message
>
> ...
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 27, 8:06 pm, "Dutch" > wrote:
> >> "Rupert" > wrote
>
> >> >> >>> Yes, there is, based on observation of primates like Koko the
> >> >> >>> gorilla
> >> >> >>> who have been taught sign language,
>
> >> >> >> Does not demonstrate that anything "matters to her."
>
> >> >> > Of course things matter to Koko,
>
> >> >> They don't. *She has no awareness that there is a world, that she will
> >> >> some day no longer be in it.
>
> >> > She does understand the concept of death,
>
> >> On what do you base this?
>
> > She has discussions about it with her caregivers.
>
> They don't know what she is thinking, if anything.
>

How do you know?

> >> > and she is aware of various
> >> > aspects of the world just as you and I are
>
> >> No, not like that, human awareness is not like non-human awareness. <I
> >> was
> >> going to elaborate but I shouldn't have to>
>
> > I didn't say that her awareness was similar to ours in every respect.
> > I said it was a property we had in common, which is true.
>
> So what? Fruit flies are aware of various aspects of the world too.
>

Ball claimed that animals are not aware of the world, which is obvious
rubbish. You may think it is a trivial point, if so take up the matter
with Ball who brought up the subject.

> > Also, her
> > awareness of the world is quite similar to what Ball's son's awareness
> > of the world was at the age of two.
>
> So you repeat the AMC again and again, but that doesn't make it a valid
> argument.
>

I didn't repeat the AMC, I made a correct assertion. If Ball wants to
claim that Koko is not aware of the world then he should also claim
that his son was not aware of the world at the age of two.

>
>
> >> > and just as your son was
> >> > when he was two years old.
>
> >> His son possessed the capability to become a PhD in mathematics or a
> >> great
> >> philosopher or musician, the ape is permanently two years old.
>
> > I think Ball's son is retarded, isn't he?
>
> > Koko is learning the letters of the alphabet, she is not "permanently
> > two years old". She has less potential for cognitive development than
> > Ball's son, even if I am correct that Ball's son is retarded. So what?
>
> Cognitively impaired humans may still possess the capability of higher
> cognition, so we err on the safe side.
>

What's "higher cognition" exactly?

> >> > She has similar linguistic and cognitive
> >> > abilities to your son at the age of two. It is extremely obvious that
> >> > things matter to her, and that she is aware of the world. She also has
> >> > some understanding of the concept of death, although she becomes
> >> > fidgety and uncomfortable when asked to discuss her own death. It is
> >> > not clear to what extent she is aware of her own mortality.
>
> >> All unsupported supposition.
>
> > No.
>
> Yes, the interpretations of her trainers have been discredited by other
> researchers. She mimics them.

Which other researchers?