It has degrees; it isn't absolute. If I see my neighbor Smith's dog get
loose and attack my neighbor Jones's cat, I'll try to stop the attack
and save Jones's cat. If I see Smith's dog attack a squirrel in the
front yard, I probably won't try to save the squirrel; if I do try to
stop the attack, it will be more out of consideration for Smith and how
he wants his dog to behave. If I see a coyote come down the street and
attack the squirrel, for certain I won't do anything to try to save the
squirrel.

The squirrel simply doesn't enter into my imprecise calculus of moral
consideration in the same way that Jones's cat does, and to the extent
it enters into it at all, it's highly context-dependent. No one gives
equal moral consideration to the interests of all beings capable of
suffering, nor should we be expected to do so. We may not be able to
say exactly where we draw lines, but that doesn't mean it's arbitrary.
In any case, the "ar" radicals tell us that arbitrariness sometimes
doesn't matter, or sometimes it does, so they are being arbitrary.

For example, I am told that it is permissible for me to take my kinship
with my child into account in deciding whether to rescue him or some
other child from an impending catastrophe where I have time to rescue
only one of them. However, the same source would tell me that if
neither of the two children were my known relatives, but if one were of
my race and the other were of a different race, I would not be able to
use race - also an indication of kinship, even if much more remotely so
than family - in deciding which one to rescue.

The sophists are trying somehow, any way they can, to find a means to
salvage something they intuitively like. There is no rigor to it at all.

On Apr 20, 7:24*pm, George Plimpton > wrote:
> It has degrees; it isn't absolute. *If I see my neighbor Smith's dog get
> loose and attack my neighbor Jones's cat, I'll try to stop the attack
> and save Jones's cat. *If I see Smith's dog attack a squirrel in the
> front yard, I probably won't try to save the squirrel; if I do try to
> stop the attack, it will be more out of consideration for Smith and how
> he wants his dog to behave. *If I see a coyote come down the street and
> attack the squirrel, for certain I won't do anything to try to save the
> squirrel.
>
> The squirrel simply doesn't enter into my imprecise calculus of moral
> consideration in the same way that Jones's cat does, and to the extent
> it enters into it at all, it's highly context-dependent. *No one gives
> equal moral consideration to the interests of all beings capable of
> suffering, nor should we be expected to do so. *We may not be able to
> say exactly where we draw lines, but that doesn't mean it's arbitrary.
> In any case, the "ar" radicals tell us that arbitrariness sometimes
> doesn't matter, or sometimes it does, so they are being arbitrary.
>
> For example, I am told that it is permissible for me to take my kinship
> with my child into account in deciding whether to rescue him or some
> other child from an impending catastrophe where I have time to rescue
> only one of them. *However, the same source would tell me that if
> neither of the two children were my known relatives, but if one were of
> my race and the other were of a different race, I would not be able to
> use race - also an indication of kinship, even if much more remotely so
> than family - in deciding which one to rescue.
>
> The sophists are trying somehow, any way they can, to find a means to
> salvage something they intuitively like. *There is no rigor to it at all.

What's your opinion about the matter? Do you think that it is
permissible to discriminate on the grounds of race in that scenario?

On 4/20/2012 10:52 AM, Rupert wrote:
> On Apr 20, 7:24 pm, George > wrote:
>> It has degrees; it isn't absolute. If I see my neighbor Smith's dog get
>> loose and attack my neighbor Jones's cat, I'll try to stop the attack
>> and save Jones's cat. If I see Smith's dog attack a squirrel in the
>> front yard, I probably won't try to save the squirrel; if I do try to
>> stop the attack, it will be more out of consideration for Smith and how
>> he wants his dog to behave. If I see a coyote come down the street and
>> attack the squirrel, for certain I won't do anything to try to save the
>> squirrel.
>>
>> The squirrel simply doesn't enter into my imprecise calculus of moral
>> consideration in the same way that Jones's cat does, and to the extent
>> it enters into it at all, it's highly context-dependent. No one gives
>> equal moral consideration to the interests of all beings capable of
>> suffering, nor should we be expected to do so. We may not be able to
>> say exactly where we draw lines, but that doesn't mean it's arbitrary.
>> In any case, the "ar" radicals tell us that arbitrariness sometimes
>> doesn't matter, or sometimes it does, so they are being arbitrary.
>>
>> For example, I am told that it is permissible for me to take my kinship
>> with my child into account in deciding whether to rescue him or some
>> other child from an impending catastrophe where I have time to rescue
>> only one of them. However, the same source would tell me that if
>> neither of the two children were my known relatives, but if one were of
>> my race and the other were of a different race, I would not be able to
>> use race - also an indication of kinship, even if much more remotely so
>> than family - in deciding which one to rescue.
>>
>> The sophists are trying somehow, any way they can, to find a means to
>> salvage something they intuitively like. There is no rigor to it at all.
>
> What's your opinion about the matter? Do you think that it is
> permissible to discriminate on the grounds of race in that scenario?

Based on the same logic of kinship that you told me permit me to
discriminate in favor of my child over the unrelated child, yes.

Feel free to tell me where the line is drawn, and why, such that kinship
becomes too weak a criterion for discrimination.

In article >,
says...
>
> It has degrees; it isn't absolute. If I see my neighbor Smith's dog get
> loose and attack my neighbor Jones's cat, I'll try to stop the attack
> and save Jones's cat. If I see Smith's dog attack a squirrel in the
> front yard, I probably won't try to save the squirrel; if I do try to
> stop the attack, it will be more out of consideration for Smith and how
> he wants his dog to behave. If I see a coyote come down the street and
> attack the squirrel, for certain I won't do anything to try to save the
> squirrel.
>
> The squirrel simply doesn't enter into my imprecise calculus of moral
> consideration in the same way that Jones's cat does, and to the extent
> it enters into it at all, it's highly context-dependent. No one gives
> equal moral consideration to the interests of all beings capable of
> suffering, nor should we be expected to do so. We may not be able to
> say exactly where we draw lines, but that doesn't mean it's arbitrary.
> In any case, the "ar" radicals tell us that arbitrariness sometimes
> doesn't matter, or sometimes it does, so they are being arbitrary.
>
> For example, I am told that it is permissible for me to take my kinship
> with my child into account in deciding whether to rescue him or some
> other child from an impending catastrophe where I have time to rescue
> only one of them. However, the same source would tell me that if
> neither of the two children were my known relatives, but if one were of
> my race and the other were of a different race, I would not be able to
> use race - also an indication of kinship, even if much more remotely so
> than family - in deciding which one to rescue.
>
> The sophists are trying somehow, any way they can, to find a means to
> salvage something they intuitively like. There is no rigor to it at all.

Ok in the "Jones' cat" case you present the decisions as being your's
alone then forcing the position of "no one gives equal moral.. etc" from
what you gave or not. This does not ground your argument simply because
there very well might be people who, in degrees, do attempt to give
equal moral consideration, so what you do becomes only what you do not a
given of what everyone does.

In your "kinship" example you now are being dedicated to or told by
'sources' without explanation of why these sources matter to you.

Bringing in the issue of race into a child rescue situation is blatant
sophistry. Here again you are being victimized by people telling you
things you can or can not do. Sort of like people on radio talk shows.
You are forcing a conclusion via a 'straw sophist argument'

As another moral excercise place yourself in the catastrophy but in a
far off land alone among people of your own race in a small tight
community suspcious of all outsiders and who spoke a language you did
not understand. A person of another race but from your home towm shows
up. What sense of kinship do you have now?

What comes out of all this is the question of how are you hearing these
really bossy sources and how do each of you, you and your sophist
sources, know so very much what the other is thinking?

On 4/21/2012 7:28 AM, Zerkon wrote:
> In article<WbidnSHeZv0jBgzSnZ2dnUVZ5vudnZ2d@giganews. com>,
> says...
>>
>> It has degrees; it isn't absolute. If I see my neighbor Smith's dog get
>> loose and attack my neighbor Jones's cat, I'll try to stop the attack
>> and save Jones's cat. If I see Smith's dog attack a squirrel in the
>> front yard, I probably won't try to save the squirrel; if I do try to
>> stop the attack, it will be more out of consideration for Smith and how
>> he wants his dog to behave. If I see a coyote come down the street and
>> attack the squirrel, for certain I won't do anything to try to save the
>> squirrel.
>>
>> The squirrel simply doesn't enter into my imprecise calculus of moral
>> consideration in the same way that Jones's cat does, and to the extent
>> it enters into it at all, it's highly context-dependent. No one gives
>> equal moral consideration to the interests of all beings capable of
>> suffering, nor should we be expected to do so. We may not be able to
>> say exactly where we draw lines, but that doesn't mean it's arbitrary.
>> In any case, the "ar" radicals tell us that arbitrariness sometimes
>> doesn't matter, or sometimes it does, so they are being arbitrary.
>>
>> For example, I am told that it is permissible for me to take my kinship
>> with my child into account in deciding whether to rescue him or some
>> other child from an impending catastrophe where I have time to rescue
>> only one of them. However, the same source would tell me that if
>> neither of the two children were my known relatives, but if one were of
>> my race and the other were of a different race, I would not be able to
>> use race - also an indication of kinship, even if much more remotely so
>> than family - in deciding which one to rescue.
>>
>> The sophists are trying somehow, any way they can, to find a means to
>> salvage something they intuitively like. There is no rigor to it at all.
>
> Ok in the "Jones' cat" case you present the decisions as being your's
> alone then forcing the position of "no one gives equal moral.. etc" from
> what you gave or not. This does not ground your argument simply because
> there very well might be people who, in degrees, do attempt to give
> equal moral consideration, so what you do becomes only what you do not a
> given of what everyone does.

I observe that no one gives equal moral consideration, including those
who say we ought to do so.


>
> In your "kinship" example you now are being dedicated to or told by
> 'sources' without explanation of why these sources matter to you.

If you had been following along here a little more attentively, you'd
know who the source is to whom I referred.


> Bringing in the issue of race into a child rescue situation is blatant
> sophistry.

How is it? What if in fact there are two children of different races?
If that's the case, then what's "sophistry" about it?


> Here again you are being victimized by people telling you
> things you can or can not do. Sort of like people on radio talk shows.
> You are forcing a conclusion via a 'straw sophist argument'

I'm not.


>
> As another moral excercise place yourself in the catastrophy but in a
> far off land alone among people of your own race in a small tight
> community suspcious of all outsiders and who spoke a language you did
> not understand. A person of another race but from your home towm shows
> up. What sense of kinship do you have now?
>
> What comes out of all this is the question of how are you hearing these
> really bossy sources and how do each of you, you and your sophist
> sources, know so very much what the other is thinking?
>

On Apr 20, 10:24*am, George Plimpton > wrote:
> It has degrees; it isn't absolute. *If I see my neighbor Smith's dog get
> loose and attack my neighbor Jones's cat, I'll try to stop the attack
> and save Jones's cat. *If I see Smith's dog attack a squirrel in the
> front yard, I probably won't try to save the squirrel; if I do try to
> stop the attack, it will be more out of consideration for Smith and how
> he wants his dog to behave. *If I see a coyote come down the street and
> attack the squirrel, for certain I won't do anything to try to save the
> squirrel.
>
> The squirrel simply doesn't enter into my imprecise calculus of moral
> consideration in the same way that Jones's cat does, and to the extent
> it enters into it at all, it's highly context-dependent. *No one gives
> equal moral consideration to the interests of all beings capable of
> suffering, nor should we be expected to do so. *We may not be able to
> say exactly where we draw lines, but that doesn't mean it's arbitrary.
> In any case, the "ar" radicals tell us that arbitrariness sometimes
> doesn't matter, or sometimes it does, so they are being arbitrary.
>
> For example, I am told that it is permissible for me to take my kinship
> with my child into account in deciding whether to rescue him or some
> other child from an impending catastrophe where I have time to rescue
> only one of them. *However, the same source would tell me that if
> neither of the two children were my known relatives, but if one were of
> my race and the other were of a different race, I would not be able to
> use race - also an indication of kinship, even if much more remotely so
> than family - in deciding which one to rescue.
>
> The sophists are trying somehow, any way they can, to find a means to
> salvage something they intuitively like. *There is no rigor to it at all.

If humans and other social animals have a propensity to be groupish,
dividing the world into an us vs them, then, would that justify making
moral choicees based upon this instinct such as helping one group but
not helping another group merely based upon a biological preference
for group identification? Is this impulse alone enough to justify
discrimination and favoritism or are there other reasons that need to
be added to justify your conclusion helping or promoting abuse?

....human nature appears to have been shaped by natural selection
working at multiple levels, including not just intra-group competition
but also inter-group competition. Haidt suggests that we have in our
minds what amounts to a “hive switch” that shuts down the self and
makes us feel, temporarily, that we are simply a part of a larger
whole (or hive). This uniquely human ability for self-transcendence is
crucial for understanding the origins of morality and religion...

http://newbooksinbrief.wordpress.com...onathan-haidt/
http://takimag.com/article/the_self_...e_sailer/print

(1) A group of bozos on a city street agree to join an social
experiment.

(2) Subjects (bozos) are divided into groups on basis of trivial
criteria like flipping a coin to deterimine if one is in Group X or
Group Y.

(3) Subjects do not interact, either within or between groups.

(4) Members of own group and other group remain anonymous.

(5) Subjects are then asked to allot money to two other subjects,
designated only by code number and group membership (X or Y). Subjects
own outcomes will not be affected by their allocation decisions.

(6) Despite minimal nature of these groups, subjects allocations
consistently favored other members of their own arbitrarily designated
groups, at the expense of members of the recently typed "outgroups".

[Tajfel] argues that the reason for this allocation strategy is to
create a differentiation between the groups which permits their group
membership to enhance their social identity.

------------------------------------------------
The Social Animal - Elliot Aronson - 8th Edition 1999
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0716733129/

Unreflected Ingroup Favoritism

One who reflects does not discriminate?: On the role of unreflected
cognitive processes for the occurrence of ingroup favoritism between
artificial groups; A categorization of individuals in two groups based
on completely trivial criteria like flipping a coin to determine which
group one is assigned (Group X or Group Y), can be sufficient to cause
mutual preferences for one's own group.

Social identity theory assumes a fundamental striving towards a
positive distinction of one's own group from other groups. The
tendency to a preference for one's own group is clearly reduced in a
situation involving intergroup judgments on negative comparison
dimensions or distribution decisions on negative stimuli (burdens,
aversive stimuli), in comparison to those in the positive realm.

These basic judgment processes may be the fundamental determining
factors of and conditions for social discrimination. Of some influence
may be the role which evaluations of oneself play for the positive
evaluation of minimal social groups. It is assumed that an unreflected
cognitive process is critical for this, in the course of which, as a
rule, the positive self-image is transferred to the new ingroup. Due
to the lesser degree of similarity to oneself, an outgroup cannot
benefit from such a generalization process.

Correspondingly, a positive distinctiveness of one's own group can
result solely from the self-ingroup relation, independent of an
ingroup-outgroup comparison. There is a generalized positive attitude
to the ingroup, and demonstrating the role of a low degree of
reflection for the occurrence of favoritism in minimal intergroup
situations and considerations of outgroups.

The randomly assigned individuals generally act as if those who share
their meaningless label are their good friends or close kin. Subjects
indicate that they like those who share their label. They rate others
who share their label as likely to have a more pleasant personality
and to have produced better output than outgroup members. Most
strikingly, subjects allocate more money and rewards to those who
share their labels.

In other related social experiments at political rallies it has been
noted that researchers faking injuries, were helped more or less
depending on whether their protest sign, and slogans supported or went
against those around them who could help.

The Social Animal - Elliot Aronson - 8th Edition 1999
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0716733129/

On 4/21/2012 10:35 AM, Immortalist wrote:
> On Apr 20, 10:24 am, George > wrote:
>> It has degrees; it isn't absolute. If I see my neighbor Smith's dog get
>> loose and attack my neighbor Jones's cat, I'll try to stop the attack
>> and save Jones's cat. If I see Smith's dog attack a squirrel in the
>> front yard, I probably won't try to save the squirrel; if I do try to
>> stop the attack, it will be more out of consideration for Smith and how
>> he wants his dog to behave. If I see a coyote come down the street and
>> attack the squirrel, for certain I won't do anything to try to save the
>> squirrel.
>>
>> The squirrel simply doesn't enter into my imprecise calculus of moral
>> consideration in the same way that Jones's cat does, and to the extent
>> it enters into it at all, it's highly context-dependent. No one gives
>> equal moral consideration to the interests of all beings capable of
>> suffering, nor should we be expected to do so. We may not be able to
>> say exactly where we draw lines, but that doesn't mean it's arbitrary.
>> In any case, the "ar" radicals tell us that arbitrariness sometimes
>> doesn't matter, or sometimes it does, so they are being arbitrary.
>>
>> For example, I am told that it is permissible for me to take my kinship
>> with my child into account in deciding whether to rescue him or some
>> other child from an impending catastrophe where I have time to rescue
>> only one of them. However, the same source would tell me that if
>> neither of the two children were my known relatives, but if one were of
>> my race and the other were of a different race, I would not be able to
>> use race - also an indication of kinship, even if much more remotely so
>> than family - in deciding which one to rescue.
>>
>> The sophists are trying somehow, any way they can, to find a means to
>> salvage something they intuitively like. There is no rigor to it at all.
>
> If humans and other social animals have a propensity to be groupish,
> dividing the world into an us vs them, then, would that justify making
> moral choicees based upon this instinct such as helping one group but
> not helping another group merely based upon a biological preference
> for group identification?

If it's a natural human tendency, then why would it need moral
justification?

On Apr 21, 12:04*pm, George Plimpton > wrote:
> On 4/21/2012 10:35 AM, Immortalist wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 20, 10:24 am, George > *wrote:
> >> It has degrees; it isn't absolute. *If I see my neighbor Smith's dog get
> >> loose and attack my neighbor Jones's cat, I'll try to stop the attack
> >> and save Jones's cat. *If I see Smith's dog attack a squirrel in the
> >> front yard, I probably won't try to save the squirrel; if I do try to
> >> stop the attack, it will be more out of consideration for Smith and how
> >> he wants his dog to behave. *If I see a coyote come down the street and
> >> attack the squirrel, for certain I won't do anything to try to save the
> >> squirrel.
>
> >> The squirrel simply doesn't enter into my imprecise calculus of moral
> >> consideration in the same way that Jones's cat does, and to the extent
> >> it enters into it at all, it's highly context-dependent. *No one gives
> >> equal moral consideration to the interests of all beings capable of
> >> suffering, nor should we be expected to do so. *We may not be able to
> >> say exactly where we draw lines, but that doesn't mean it's arbitrary.
> >> In any case, the "ar" radicals tell us that arbitrariness sometimes
> >> doesn't matter, or sometimes it does, so they are being arbitrary.
>
> >> For example, I am told that it is permissible for me to take my kinship
> >> with my child into account in deciding whether to rescue him or some
> >> other child from an impending catastrophe where I have time to rescue
> >> only one of them. *However, the same source would tell me that if
> >> neither of the two children were my known relatives, but if one were of
> >> my race and the other were of a different race, I would not be able to
> >> use race - also an indication of kinship, even if much more remotely so
> >> than family - in deciding which one to rescue.
>
> >> The sophists are trying somehow, any way they can, to find a means to
> >> salvage something they intuitively like. *There is no rigor to it at all.
>
> > If humans and other social animals have a propensity to be groupish,
> > dividing the world into an us vs them, then, would that justify making
> > moral choicees based upon this instinct such as helping one group but
> > not helping another group merely based upon a biological preference
> > for group identification?
>
> If it's a natural human tendency, then why would it need moral
> justification?

In court cases involving pathological groupishness like racial
discrimination and numerous other nasty and beastly human behaviors?

"Immortalist" > wrote
> On Apr 21, 12:04 pm, George Plimpton > wrote:

>> If it's a natural human tendency, then why would it need moral
>> justification?
>
> In court cases involving pathological groupishness like racial
> discrimination and numerous other nasty and beastly human behaviors?

Discrimination is not wrong by default, that is a modern misconception.

On 4/22/2012 11:56 AM, Dutch wrote:
> "Immortalist" > wrote
>> On Apr 21, 12:04 pm, George Plimpton > wrote:
>
>>> If it's a natural human tendency, then why would it need moral
>>> justification?
>>
>> In court cases involving pathological groupishness like racial
>> discrimination and numerous other nasty and beastly human behaviors?
>
> Discrimination is not wrong by default, that is a modern misconception.

To discriminate merely means to choose. A discriminating customer is
one who is knowledgeable about the products or services and does not
accept those that are inadequate to his needs.

There is one aspect of human life in which the overwhelming majority of
people discriminate on the basis of race. No laws have ever been passed
to prohibit it, and few say that people ought not do it. Can you (or
anyone) guess what it is? This same aspect of human life typically
involves another form of discrimination along a different dimension,
although literally no one says it ought not occur.

On Sat, 21 Apr 2012 08:46:25 -0700, Goo wrote:

>I observe that no one gives equal moral consideration, including those
>who say we ought to do so.

"There is no "consideration" to be given." - Goo

"It is irrelevant what I think *is* important enough to
merit consideration." - Goo

"When considering your food choices ethically, assign
ZERO weight to the morally empty fact that choosing to
eat meat causes animals to be bred into existence." - Goo

"You consider that it "got to experience life" to be some kind
of mitigation of the evil of killing it." - Goo

"The meaningless fact-lette that farm animals "get to
experience life" deserves no consideration when asking
whether or not it is moral to kill them. Zero." - Goo

"the moral harm caused by killing them is greater in magnitude
than ANY benefit they might derive from "decent lives" - Goo

""giving them life" does NOT mitigate the wrongness of
their deaths" - Goo

"Causing animals to be born and "get to experience life"
(in ****wit's wretched prose) is no mitigation at all for
killing them." - Goo

"Fact: IF it is wrong to kill animals deliberately for food, then
having deliberately caused them to live in the first place does
not mitigate the wrong in any way." - Goo

"Life "justifying" death is the
stupidest goddamned thing you ever wrote." - Goo

"no matter how "decent" the conditions are, the deliberate killing
of the animals erases all of it." - Goo

""appreciation for decent AW" doesn't *MEAN* anything" - Goo

""appreciation for decent AW" doesn't mean anything." - Goo

"NO livestock benefit from being farmed." - Goo

"No farm animals benefit from farming." - Goo

"Existing animals don't figure into it in any
way." - Goo.

"The only way that the concept "benefit from existence"
can begin to make sense semantically is if one assumes
a pre-existent state" - Goo

"We ARE NOT, and NEVER WERE, talking about whether
existing animals "benefit" from living." - Goo

"The topic is not and never has been whether or not
existing animals enjoy living." - Goo

"Whether or not some entity enjoys life once it does exist
is *NOT* the topic." - Goo

"coming into existence didn't make me better off than
I was before." - Goo

"it is not "better" that the animal exist, no matter
its quality of live" - Goo

"It is not "better" in any moral way, and not in *any* way
at all to the animal itself, that the animal exists." - Goo

"Being born is not a benefit in any way. It can't be." - Goo

""giving them life" does NOT mitigate the wrongness of
their deaths" - Goo

****wit David Harrison, in between attempts at breeding fighting dogs, lied:

> On Sat, 21 Apr 2012 08:46:25 -0700, George Plimpton wrote:
>
>> I observe that no one gives equal moral consideration, including those
>> who say we ought to do so.
>
> "There is no "consideration" to be given." - Prof. Geo. Plimpton

The consideration in that quote is the fake "consideration" you pretend
to give to their "getting to experience life", ****wit. The moral
considerability I and others are talking about here is the consideration
due the interests of the animals. No consideration is due to their
"getting to experience life", ****wit.

On Mon, 23 Apr 2012 14:28:12 -0700, Goo wrote:

>On Mon, 23 Apr 2012 17:24:12 -0400, dh@. wrote:
>
>>On Sat, 21 Apr 2012 08:46:25 -0700, Goo wrote:
>>
>>>I observe that no one gives equal moral consideration, including those
>>>who say we ought to do so.
>>
>>"There is no "consideration" to be given." - Goo
>
>The consideration in that quote is the fake "consideration" you pretend
>to give to their "getting to experience life"

Obviously I do give it consideration Goo, both for the animals I consume
parts of and also for the billions more that I don't. I make you give it
consideration too Goob, even though you don't want to you do, and you
deliberately oppose people appreciating the result when AW regulations provide
billions of animals with lives of positive value.

>, ****wit. The moral
>considerability I and others are talking about here is the consideration
>due the interests of the animals.

That's the decent lives of positive value part, Goo. Remember it's the part
that YOU are opposed to people taking into consideration because doing so can
work against the elimination objective.

>No consideration is due to their
>"getting to experience life", ****wit.

As much or more than their deaths Goob.

>>"It is irrelevant what I think *is* important enough to
>>merit consideration." - Goo
>>
>>"When considering your food choices ethically, assign
>>ZERO weight to the morally empty fact that choosing to
>>eat meat causes animals to be bred into existence." - Goo
>>
>>"You consider that it "got to experience life" to be some kind
>>of mitigation of the evil of killing it." - Goo
>>
>>"The meaningless fact-lette that farm animals "get to
>>experience life" deserves no consideration when asking
>>whether or not it is moral to kill them. Zero." - Goo
>>
>>"the moral harm caused by killing them is greater in magnitude
>>than ANY benefit they might derive from "decent lives" - Goo
>>
>>""giving them life" does NOT mitigate the wrongness of
>>their deaths" - Goo
>>
>>"Causing animals to be born and "get to experience life"
>>(in ****wit's wretched prose) is no mitigation at all for
>>killing them." - Goo
>>
>>"Fact: IF it is wrong to kill animals deliberately for food, then
>>having deliberately caused them to live in the first place does
>>not mitigate the wrong in any way." - Goo
>>
>>"Life "justifying" death is the
>>stupidest goddamned thing you ever wrote." - Goo
>>
>>"no matter how "decent" the conditions are, the deliberate killing
>>of the animals erases all of it." - Goo
>>
>>""appreciation for decent AW" doesn't *MEAN* anything" - Goo
>>
>>""appreciation for decent AW" doesn't mean anything." - Goo
>>
>>"NO livestock benefit from being farmed." - Goo
>>
>>"No farm animals benefit from farming." - Goo
>>
>>"Existing animals don't figure into it in any
>>way." - Goo.
>>
>>"The only way that the concept "benefit from existence"
>>can begin to make sense semantically is if one assumes
>>a pre-existent state" - Goo
>>
>>"We ARE NOT, and NEVER WERE, talking about whether
>>existing animals "benefit" from living." - Goo
>>
>>"The topic is not and never has been whether or not
>>existing animals enjoy living." - Goo
>>
>>"Whether or not some entity enjoys life once it does exist
>>is *NOT* the topic." - Goo
>>
>>"coming into existence didn't make me better off than
>>I was before." - Goo
>>
>>"it is not "better" that the animal exist, no matter
>>its quality of live" - Goo
>>
>>"It is not "better" in any moral way, and not in *any* way
>>at all to the animal itself, that the animal exists." - Goo
>>
>>"Being born is not a benefit in any way. It can't be." - Goo
>>
>>""giving them life" does NOT mitigate the wrongness of
>>their deaths" - Goo

****wit David Harrison, a lying convicted fighting bird breeder, lied:

>>>
>>>> I observe that no one gives equal moral consideration, including those
>>>> who say we ought to do so.
>>>
>>> "There is no "consideration" to be given." - Prof. Geo. Plimpton
>>
>> The consideration in that quote is the fake "consideration" you pretend
>> to give to their "getting to experience life"
>
> Obviously I do give it consideration

You give the quality of their lives *zero* consideration, Goo.


>
>> , ****wit. The moral
>> considerability I and others are talking about here is the consideration
>> due the interests of the animals.
>
> That's the decent lives of positive value part

The part to which you give *no* consideration, Goo. I've proved it, via
your own quotes.


>> No consideration is due to their
>> "getting to experience life", ****wit.
>
> As much or more than their deaths

*None*, Goo. No consideration is due their "getting to experience
life", Goo - none at all.

On Apr 20, 11:24*am, George Plimpton > wrote:
> It has degrees; it isn't absolute. *If I see my neighbor Smith's dog get
> loose and attack my neighbor Jones's cat, I'll try to stop the attack
> and save Jones's cat. *If I see Smith's dog attack a squirrel in the
> front yard, I probably won't try to save the squirrel; if I do try to
> stop the attack, it will be more out of consideration for Smith and how
> he wants his dog to behave. *If I see a coyote come down the street and
> attack the squirrel, for certain I won't do anything to try to save the
> squirrel.
>
> The squirrel simply doesn't enter into my imprecise calculus of moral
> consideration in the same way that Jones's cat does, and to the extent
> it enters into it at all, it's highly context-dependent. *No one gives
> equal moral consideration to the interests of all beings capable of
> suffering, nor should we be expected to do so. *We may not be able to
> say exactly where we draw lines, but that doesn't mean it's arbitrary.
> In any case, the "ar" radicals tell us that arbitrariness sometimes
> doesn't matter, or sometimes it does, so they are being arbitrary.
>
> For example, I am told that it is permissible for me to take my kinship
> with my child into account in deciding whether to rescue him or some
> other child from an impending catastrophe where I have time to rescue
> only one of them. *However, the same source would tell me that if
> neither of the two children were my known relatives, but if one were of
> my race and the other were of a different race, I would not be able to
> use race - also an indication of kinship, even if much more remotely so
> than family - in deciding which one to rescue.
>
> The sophists are trying somehow, any way they can, to find a means to
> salvage something they intuitively like. *There is no rigor to it at all.


If Smith's dog attacks you Gooberdoodle what if anything do you think
Jones's cat should do about it?

On Tue, 24 Apr 2012 15:50:55 -0700, Goo wrote:

>On Tue, 24 Apr 2012 18:29:40 -0400, dh@. wrote:
>
>>On Mon, 23 Apr 2012 14:28:12 -0700, Goo wrote:
>>
>>>On Mon, 23 Apr 2012, dh@. quoted Goo revealing that
>>> quality of life doesn't matter to him:
>>>
>>>>"the moral harm caused by killing them is greater in magnitude
>>>>than ANY benefit they might derive from "decent lives" - Goo
>
>You give the quality of their lives *zero* consideration, Goo.

Your quote above proves that quality means nothing to you, Goo.
.. . .
>>>>"no matter how "decent" the conditions are, the deliberate killing
>>>>of the animals erases all of it." - Goo
>>>>
>>>>""appreciation for decent AW" doesn't *MEAN* anything" - Goo
>>>>
>>>>""appreciation for decent AW" doesn't mean anything." - Goo
>>>>
>>>>"NO livestock benefit from being farmed." - Goo
>>>>
>>>>"No farm animals benefit from farming." - Goo
.. . .
>>>>"The topic is not and never has been whether or not
>>>>existing animals enjoy living." - Goo
.. . .
>>>>"it is not "better" that the animal exist, no matter
>>>>its quality of live" - Goo
>
>The part to which you give *no* consideration, Goo. I've proved it, via
>your own quotes.

I proved that you give no consideration to the part about quality of life by
posting your quotes Goob. You have confirmed that it means nothing to you, but I
proved it to begin with by quoting you specifically saying so.

>>>>"It is not "better" in any moral way, and not in *any* way
>>>>at all to the animal itself, that the animal exists." - Goo
>>>>
>>>>"Being born is not a benefit in any way. It can't be." - Goo
>>>>
>>>>""giving them life" does NOT mitigate the wrongness of
>>>>their deaths" - Goo

****wit David Harrison, convicted felon (cockfighting), lied:

>>>>
>>>>> "the moral harm caused by killing them is greater in magnitude
>>>>> than ANY benefit they might derive from "decent lives"

Not a quote.


>>
>> You give the quality of their lives *zero* consideration, Goo.
>
> Your quote above proves that quality means nothing to you

No.

On Mon, 30 Apr 2012 16:57:27 -0700, Goo wrote:

>On Mon, 30 Apr 2012 18:41:36 -0400, dh@. wrote:
>
>>On Tue, 24 Apr 2012 15:50:55 -0700, Goo wrote:
>>
>>>On Tue, 24 Apr 2012 18:29:40 -0400, dh@. wrote:
>>>
>>>>On Mon, 23 Apr 2012 14:28:12 -0700, Goo wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>On Mon, 23 Apr 2012, dh@. quoted Goo revealing that
>>>>> quality of life doesn't matter to him:
>>>>>
>>>>>>"the moral harm caused by killing them is greater in magnitude
>>>>>>than ANY benefit they might derive from "decent lives" - Goo
>>>
>>>You give the quality of their lives *zero* consideration, Goo.
>>
>> Your quote above proves that quality means nothing to you, Goo.
>>. . .
>>>>>>"no matter how "decent" the conditions are, the deliberate killing
>>>>>>of the animals erases all of it." - Goo
>>>>>>
>>>>>>""appreciation for decent AW" doesn't *MEAN* anything" - Goo
>>>>>>
>>>>>>""appreciation for decent AW" doesn't mean anything." - Goo
>>>>>>
>>>>>>"NO livestock benefit from being farmed." - Goo
>>>>>>
>>>>>>"No farm animals benefit from farming." - Goo
>>. . .
>>>>>>"The topic is not and never has been whether or not
>>>>>>existing animals enjoy living." - Goo
>>. . .
>>>>>>"it is not "better" that the animal exist, no matter
>>>>>>its quality of live" - Goo
>>>
>>>The part to which you give *no* consideration, Goo. I've proved it, via
>>>your own quotes.
>>
>> I proved that you give no consideration to the part about quality of life by
>>posting your quotes Goob. You have confirmed that it means nothing to you, but I
>>proved it to begin with by quoting you specifically saying so.
>
>No.

Yes that's how I proved it Goob.

>>>>>>"It is not "better" in any moral way, and not in *any* way
>>>>>>at all to the animal itself, that the animal exists." - Goo
>>>>>>
>>>>>>"Being born is not a benefit in any way. It can't be." - Goo
>>>>>>
>>>>>>""giving them life" does NOT mitigate the wrongness of
>>>>>>their deaths" - Goo

****wit David Harrison, a felon convicted of engaging in illegal animal
combats, lied:

>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "the moral harm caused by killing them is greater in magnitude
>>>>>>> than ANY benefit they might derive from "decent lives"

Not a quote. This has been established beyond all dispute.



>>>> The part to which you give *no* consideration, Goo. I've proved it, via
>>>> your own quotes.

It's not out of consideration for porcupines
that we don't raise them for food. It's because
they would be a pain in the ass to raise. We
don't raise cattle out of consideration for them
either, but because they're fairly easy to
raise.
Goo/****wit David Harrison - Sep 26, 2005

I am not an extremist about it, and if I thought
that all of the animals I eat had terrible
lives, I would still eat meat. That is not
because I don't care about them at all, but I
would just ignore their suffering.
Goo/****wit David Harrison - Nov 29, 1999

I would eat animals even if I thought that it was
cruel to them, and even if they gained nothing from
the deal. Is that what you want me to say? It is true.
But that doesn't mean that I can't still like the animals
also....
Goo/****wit David Harrison - Sept 23, 1999

I don't try to eat ethically, because I don't really care enough
to make the effort.
Goo/****wit David Harrison - July 31, 2003


>>> I proved that you give no consideration to the part about quality of life
>>
>> No.
>
> Yes that's how

No. I do give consideration to the quality of animals' lives, Goo, but
you don't - all you care about is that they exist. See above.